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An Overview

1

Myron H. Ross
Western Michigan University

The purpose of this chapter is to comment on and give the
general flavor of the papers presented in the seminar on the
Economics of Aging given by the Department of Economics
of Western Michigan University during the academic year
1983-84.

Munnell-Schulz
Alicia Munnell provides an excellent account of the finan
cial outlook for the social security system over the next 75
years. In retrospect she notes that the present day financial
problems of the system have come about because of
forecasting errors with regard to demographics and the
economy.
Munnell emphasizes that the key relationship is the growth
of nominal wages relative to the growth of the price level,
i.e., the growth of real wages. Taxes depend mainly on the
nominal wage level and social security benefits depend main
ly on the price level because benefits are indexed. Thus, if
nominal wages grow faster than the price level, taxes will
grow relative to benefits.
In addition, Munnell underscores the fact that small errors
in forecasting can have significant effects on how one views
the viability of the social security system. In general, she
finds that for the next 75 years the system will run surpluses.
Munnell summarizes matters by asserting:
During the period 1990-2020, almost no uncertain
ties exist about the adequacy of social security

financing. Even under the pessimistic mortality and
economic assumptions the system will run surpluses
until 2013 and have positive fund balances until
2020.
She notes that even if the economy performs more poorly
than anticipated under the pessimistic assumption that real
wages grow less than 1 percent, revenues will still be ade
quate to cover benefits.
Could there be problems of managing this surplus? Munnell indicates that Congress has three alternatives:
(1) reduce social security tax rates.
(2) divert these surpluses to finance other programs.
(3) let tax rate increases planned in 1990 take effect.
Suppose surpluses are generated in excess of expectations
and Congress does not reduce social security taxes or divert
surpluses to finance other programs. It is possible that the
surpluses generated may be so large that the trustees of the
system (the Secretaries of Health and Human Services,
Labor and Treasury) may be compelled to invest these funds
in private securities, rather than public securities. Whichever
alternative is chosen, there are potential problems.
If the trustees were to invest in privately held securities, it
can be asked how the trustees will do this without destroying
the traditional boundary between the private and public sec
tors. It is not out of the question that such a policy might
result in cabinet officers deciding which large corporations
to take over.
To give a rough order of magnitudes involved, for 1984
benefits from OASI, DI, and HI totaled $221.3 billion. Sup
pose, not unrealistically, the trust fund were double benefits,
or $442.6 billion. The trustees could then purchase about 15
percent of the $3 trillion publicly held stock on the New York

Stock Exchange. By concentrating purchases of stock, the
trustees could obtain a controlling interest in some corpora
tions. If the trustees alternatively invested the surplus in the
private bond market, the trustees may find that they have a
controlling interest in corporations that end up in bankrupt
cy, as the bondholders are converted to stockholders. 1
If the annual surplus of $442.6 billion were totally invested
in U.S. Treasury securities, the trustees would be holding
about 28 percent of the national debt. With a smaller percen
tage of the national debt held by the public and the banking
system, it would probably significantly diminish the power
of the Federal Reserve to control bank reserves via open
market operations. In any event, the prospect of larger social
security fund surpluses will not only change the social securi
ty system, but will also have a significant effect on the func
tioning of the economy.
In essence Munnell holds that the "crisis" in financing the
social security system is almost entirely due to unforeseen
circumstances—particularly the economic malaise of the last
decade, with its low and declining growth rates, reduced pro
ductivity levels and high unemployment rates.
Schulz emphasizes that there is little payoff if we merely
shift from social security to private pensions. He emphasizes
that social security developed as a result of the failure of
alternatives. In one sense, the development of social security
was hardly revolutionary, since prior to World War II we
already had an informal pay-as-you-go system whereby
family members took care of the elderly. This informal
private system, because of its shortcomings, gave way to the
present social security system.
There is reason to believe that we need diversity of old age
provisions, private as well as public. If we think of the provi
sion for old age as an investment problem, then our aim is to

minimize risk by minimizing the variance around the mean
retirement income, for a given return. This would call for
diversification. That is, the variance for (say) a single public
system of social security would be higher than a combined
public and private system, as long as the returns from the
two systems are independent. If the returns from private and
public pension plans are negatively correlated, then the
overall variance will be reduced further. Perhaps this
negative relationship may have held during the last decade.
With high rates of inflation the public social security benefits
improved because of the upward bias in the consumer price
index, while the private pension benefits worsened because
of the lack of indexing. Thus in real terms the returns from
private and public benefits appear to have moved in opposite
directions.
This relationship may be changed if the U.S. Treasury
were to issue (as the British Treasury does) a fully indexed
bond. This would protect the individual against inflation and
put private pensions on a par with public pensions when it
comes to indexing.
Clark-Quinn

Clark makes the fundamental point that the elderly are no
more vulnerable to inflation than the rest of the population.
The converse is a common and erroneous conclusion based
on the argument that the elderly live on fixed incomes. Clark
puts the problem in perspective when he says,
Real income from current assets depends on the
rate of return compared with the change in prices.
The elderly experience inflation effects different
from others only if the makeup of their portfolios
differs.
Empirical support for Clark's conclusion is found in the fact
that in 1982, coming after years of double-digit inflation, the

percentage of the elderly poor was less than the percentage of
the general population which were poor.
These results must be handled cautiously, because Clark
depends on the consumer price index to deflate incomes.
Clark recognizes that the CPI has an upward bias, though
there is considerable controversy as to the magnitude of the
upward bias. Not only is the CPI biased upward because it is
a Laspeyre index, but it also fails to take into account the
fact that the elderly receive a wide range of discounts in
many restaurants, motels, movies, pharmacies, etc. In fact,
one of the most important discounts is given by the tax col
lector, with the federal government providing for a double
exemption under the personal income tax regulations. In ad
dition, many states, such as Michigan, have a "circuit
breaker" which limits the increase in property taxes.
If these discounts in favor of the elderly developed in a
short period of time, they would have no effect on changes in
the relative status of the elderly. However, if the discounts
developed gradually—and this seems to be the case—they
would bias the year-to-year changes in the relative status of
the elderly.
The red thread running through Quinn's presentation is
that incentives to retire at age 65 are quite strong. If a worker
does not retire at age 65, "social security and employer pen
sions impose pay cuts. . . . Many older workers respond ex
actly how you might expect to pay cuts—they stop working
and retire." These paycuts are not direct reductions of the
paycheck. Rather, the paycuts involve a reduction in the
wealth of the worker.
Quinn believes that workers' perceptions with regard to
how the social security system operates are reasonably ac
curate. Workers' behavior suggests that they have calculated
the benefit-cost ratio of retiring. By taking the net present
value of future income streams, Quinn demonstrates that it

pays to retire. The cost is the loss of social security benefits
for one year; the benefits are the increase in future benefits
associated with delayed retirement. Put differently, the in
dividual has a choice between two income streams, one that
begins immediately to pay social security benefits and
another which is delayed for one year. Most frequently, the
former stream is preferred to the latter stream, and workers
behave rationally by retiring.
Quinn notes that because the actuarial adjustment in
benefits is to increase from the current 1 percent to 7 percent,
beginning in 1990, for each year of delayed retirement, the
disincentives for working will be significantly diminished,
and later retirement should occur.

Berkowitz
Berkowitz raises in bold relief the difference between
chronological age and functional age. Since functional age is
more difficult to determine than chronological—even
though the former is more important than the latter—there is
"statistical" age discrimination when firms assume a close
correlation between functional and chronological age. Firms
are inclined to use chronological age as a proxy for determiing functional age.
But if we discard the use of chronological age—which is
definite and objective—what alternative criteria are there?
Berkowitz spells out the many difficulties involved in deter
mining functional age in workers' compensation cases and in
the disability program under social security. He notes that
"... nothing in the disability experience provides any aid or
comfort to those who allege that we should eliminate com
pulsory retirement and judge persons by their ability to do
the job."
Berkowitz cites experience with workers' compensation in
Florida and Michigan. The Michigan experience is par-

ticularly illuminating. In Michigan, many workers who
retired from automobile plants simultaneously filed a claim
for workers' compensation. Berkowitz makes it clear that no
state program has a perfect solution to the workers' compen
sation problem.
Other problems in determining functional age are il
lustrated by the operation of the disability program under
the social security system. For one thing, the law is written so
that a worker is considered either disabled or not disabled.
No allowance is made for partial disability. This problem is
particularly acute in the case of disability resulting from
mental illness. Diagnosis of mental disability is difficult and
the worker may often appear able for an extended period of
time and yet suffer severe mental problems at other times.
Berkowitz points out that we are uncertain whether the in
crease in mortality increases morbidity or whether increase in
mortality decreases morbidity. Thus at the present time we
have no firm empirical evidence regarding the link between
mortality and morbidity. Finally, if we were to abolish com
pulsory retirement, we would need, according to Berkowitz,
a better measure of functional limitation. He concludes:
. . . the argument for abolition of compulsory
retirement centers around the notion that
chronological age is irrelevant. The sword cuts both
ways. Some older people are competent past the
age of retirement and some younger people are in
competent prior to the age of retirement.
Eliminating compulsory retirement means that we
have to get serious about tests of performance for
younger workers.
A general comment should be made in conclusion. In
much of the discussion and analysis of the social security
system during the seminar and at other times, it is recognized
that changes in the economy will have a significant impact on

the social security system. However, it is not always
recognized (or at least it is poorly recognized) that changes in
the social security system's functioning will have an impact
on the economy. The social security system is not akin to
Alfred Marshall's fish market, because income effects loom
large. To get some perspective on this problem of mutual
causation, let us examine a fairly simple illustration.
What is the impact of an increase in social security benefits
on the surplus of the social security system? To answer this
question it is necessary to utilize a standard macro model.
The surplus (S) is the difference between tax revenues and
benefits paid out. Tax revenues are endogenous, equaling the
product of the social security tax rate and the level of real na
tional income (tY). Benefits (B) are considered to be ex
ogenous. Thus we have,
S = tY- B
dS/dB = t(dY/dB)- 1
If there is significant unemployment, the benefit
multiplier, dY/dB, might be as high as two, i.e., a one dollar
increase in benefits will be associated with a two dollar in
crease in national income. This also signifies that the surplus
in the social security system will not fall by one dollar for
every dollar increase in benefits. Rather, assuming a tax rate
of 0.10 and using the above equation, the surplus will
decrease by eighty cents for a dollar increase in benefits.
Thus,
dS/dB=.10(2)- 1=-0.8
Some qualifications to this result should be noted. With
the economy operating close to full employment, much of
the increase in benefits will tend to crowd out other expen
ditures, or may be spent in price level increases rather than
increases in real income. The dY/dB would then be in the
neighborhood of zero and dS/dB would be equal to minus

one. At the other extreme it should be noted that it is possi
ble to postulate a reasonable model where dS/dB is positive.
By "reasonable" it is meant that the model is stable, and in
vestment is not only a function of the interest rate, but also
the income level. By the same reasoning, it may be concluded
that a one dollar increase in social security taxes will not in
crease the surplus by one dollar, since the tax increase will
tend to decrease real national income.
There are many other problems which focus upon the
mutual causation of social security and the economy. For ex
ample, to take a long run problem, does a change in social
security taxes change the growth rate of national income, or
does it change the level of national income. The conclusions
will vary depending upon what growth model is considered
relevant. These questions, however, are topics for another
seminar.

NOTE
1. Some of these issues are raised by Stuart Street, "A Looming Federal
Surplus," Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1984, p. 23. Peter Drucker
also discusses similar problems with regard to private pension funds in
The Unseen Revolution (Harper and Row, 1976).
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The Outlook for Social Security
in the Wake of the
1983 Amendments
Alicia H. Munnell*
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Twice during the last ten years, social security's financial
problems have thrust the system onto the front page of
newspapers and the cover of weekly magazines. Questions
were raised about the program* s ability to continue to pay
benefits and some observers predicted the system's imminent
"bankruptcy." Yet now, only a year after the peak of the
whoopla, the social security program is out of the headlines
and few question its financial soundness. This seems like an
appropriate time to explore what led to the recent financial
crises, how the changes enacted in 1983 restored financial
balance according to the intermediate assumptions of the
system's Board of Trustees, and what are the major areas of
uncertainty that necessarily attend any estimates of income
and expenditures over a 75-year period.

/. The Social Security Program Today
The social security system consists of three programs
financed through separate trust funds. The Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, which pays benefits to
retired workers, their dependents and survivors, is the largest
program and will dispense $158 billion in benefits to 32
million beneficiaries in 1984 (see Table 1). The Disability In
surance (DI) program, which awards benefits to disabled
workers and their dependents, will pay $17 billion to roughly
4 million beneficiaries in 1984. The third program, Hospital
*The author would like to thank Robert M. Ball and Robert J. Myers for valuable com
ments.
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Table 1
Benefits, Beneficiaries and Trust Fund Reserves under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI),
Disability Insurance (DI) and Hospital Insurance (HI), Selected Years, 1950-1984
Benefits
<$ billions)

Beneficiaries0
(millions)

Year

OASI

DI

HI

Total

1950

1.0

-

—

1960

10.7

0.6

--

1970

28.8

3.1

1980

105.1

15.5

Total

HIb

Trust fund
reserves0
($ billions)

-

2.9
14.2

--

22.6

22.6

0.5
2.6

25.2

20.4

41.3

30.4

4.7

35.1

27.6

OASI

DI

1.0

2.9

11.3

13.7

5.1

37.0

25.1

145.6

13.7

40.1
158.2
1984
17.2
45.9
221.3
32.5
3.9
36.4
29.8
38.3d
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 20, p. 60, Table 22, p. 64, Table 28, p. 75.Table A3, p. 93, Table
A4, p. 95; 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (GPO, 1982), Table 6, p. 31; and data
from Office of the Actuary and Division of Medicare Cost Analysis.
a. Beneficiaries with monthly benefits in current-payment status as of June 30th.
b. Includes both aged and disabled eligible individuals. As of July 1, 1973 hospital insurance protection was extended to disabled persons who
had been on the disability rolls for 24 months.
c. Reserves in OASI, DI and HI trust funds at end of period.
d. Estimated by Office of the Actuary, November 16, 1983, using Intermediate Assumption II-B.

-
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Insurance (HI), pays benefits to individuals covered by
OASDI and the Railroad Retirement program. Benefit
payments from this fund will amount to $46 billion in 1984.
Most HI beneficiaries also participate in the voluntary Sup
plementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program. The follow
ing discussion will center primarily on the Old-Age, Sur
vivors, and Disability portion of the program, since this was
the area addressed by the National Commission on Social
Security Reform and subsequently by Congress in its
deliberations on the 1983 Amendments.
The social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis. The 120 million active workers and their employers
pay taxes to finance the benefits for the 36 million retired
and disabled workers and their dependents and survivors.
The idea is not to build up a large reserve from which
benefits will be paid, but rather to accumulate sufficient
funds to provide a buffer against brief, unanticipated
economic fluctuations. At one time it was thought that a
reserve equal to one year's benefits would be appropriate,
but since 1970 the trust funds have held substantially less
than that amount.
Generally, the smallness of trust fund reserves should not
be a source of concern in a social insurance program as it
would in a private insurance plan. Because private plans can
not be certain of receiving future premiums, they must have
adequate funding procedures to meet all prior and current
commitments. In contrast, the social security system is a
mandatory and permanent program which can rely on the
government's taxing power to meet its obligations and can
levy taxes on successive generations of workers to pay for
retirement, disability, and hospital benefits. Thus, the
system has evolved into a compact between generations, each
generation depending on the next one to finance promised
benefits.
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II. Reasons for the Financial Problems
Pay-as-you-go financing, however, makes the financial
status of the social security system sensitive to economic and
demographic developments. Short-run problems can arise if
economic fluctuations adversely affect receipts or outlays
and contingency reserves are not adequate to cover the
resulting deficits. Long-run financing problems can arise if
the size of the beneficiary population increases relative to the
working population and the full extent of this shift has not
been taken into account in the financing provisions.
In 1983, the social security system faced both of these dif
ficulties. The system was confronted with an immediate
short term cash flow problem and a conceptually distinct
long-run imbalance between revenues and outlays. The
short-run difficulties were almost entirely the result of the
unanticipated poor performance of the economy during the
1970s, while the long-run deficits were primarily attributable
to projected cost increase associated with the rising ratio of
beneficiaries to covered workers after the turn of the cen
tury.
Short-Run Financial Difficulties. The year 1972 is a useful
point from which to trace the origins of the short-run finan
cial cirses, since legislation passed in that year introduced a
new social security financing and benefit schedule. For the
first time, benefits would be adjusted automatically to keep
pace with inflation and the taxable wage base would increase
each year to reflect the growth in average wages. In
retrospect, the 1972 legislation contained two problems.
The first was a flaw in the indexing procedure which,
under assumptions of high future inflation rates, caused the
replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to preretirement earn
ings) to increase over time. The second was a forecasting er
ror which resulted in tax rates that were based on overly op-
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timistic economic assumptions. Essentially, the social securi
ty Trustees assumed that the economy in the 1970s would
operate at roughly the level experienced during the 1960s. A
pay-as-you-go system with automatic indexing provisions is
very sensitive to economic conditions, particularly to the
relationship between the rate of price increase and the rate of
wage growth. Tax revenues vary with the growth of wages,
while benefits rise with increases in the consumer price index.
In order to understand the sensitivity of the social security
system to forecasting errors, consider the effect on a trust
fund (equal to one year's outgo) of first overestimating the
growth of wages by 2 percentage points. 1 If wages grow by 2
percentage points less than projected, payroll tax revenues
will fall 2 percent short of the anticipated level and, where
balance had been predicted between revenues and expen
ditures, a 2 percent shortfall will emerge. This shortfall will
be covered by drawing down trust fund reserves and the
reserve ratio (the ratio of reserves on hand to annual expen
ditures) will fall by 2 percentage points from the level
originally projected. Even if wages grow in all subsequent
years by the rate forecasted, the level of average wages, and
hence tax revenues, will continue to be 2 percent lower than
projected. The revenue-expenditure gap will never close, and
in each subsequent year the 2 percent shortfall will require a
transfer from the trust fund, causing the fund ratio to be
another 2 percentage points lower than projected. In other
words, after four years the one-shot error in forecasting
wage growth will cause the trust fund ratio to be 8 percentage
points lower than projected.
Should the forecasting error persist, that is, actual wage
growth continue to fall below projected growth for several
years, then the financial health of the program deteriorates
far more rapidly. The social security actuaries have
developed a simple rule of thumb that relates the difference
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between the actual and projected reserve ratio (ARR) in a
given year (n) to the forecasting error (ERR) in each year (t):
n
ARR= 2 (n-(t-l)) ERRt
t=l
According to this rule, a persistent 2 percentage point
discrepancy between actual and projected wage growth
reduces the reserve ratio by 2 percentage points after one
year, 6 points after two years, 12 points after three years and
20 points after four years.
On the other hand, if the error is one of overestimating the
inflation rate by 2 percentage points, benefits, which are in
dexed to inflation, will be 2 percent less than projected.
Thus, a one-shot error in forecasting inflation will allow the
trust fund to increase each year by roughly 2 percentage
points, while a persistent error will allow the trust fund to in
crease by 2, 6, 12 and 20 percentage points after the first, sec
ond, third and fourth year as discussed above.
As you can see, a 2 percent error in forecasting both wage
growth and inflation would have largely offsetting effects
and virtually no impact on the financial status of the pro
gram. In contrast, overestimating wage growth and
underestimating inflation each by 2 percent would have a
devastating effect on trust fund reserves. Hence, the key
relationship is not the level of wage growth and inflation, but
the difference between the rate of growth of wages and the
rate of increase in prices. This number is generally referred
to as the real wage differential. 2
When the new tax and benefit schedules were established
in 1972, it was assumed that the real wage differential would
return to the trend rate of growth set in the 1960s (see Table
2). That is, the social security revenue and outlay projections
were based on a real wage differential of 2.25 percent per
year. Under this assumption, the reserve ratio would have re-
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mained fairly steady at 80 percent. Over the next five years,
however, that is, from 1973 to 1977, the real wage differen
tial actually averaged -0.3 percent rather than 2.25 percent.
Primarily because of this difference, social security began to
run annual deficits, which required annual transfers from
the trust fund, so that by 1977 the reserve ratio had fallen to
less than one-half of the projected 80 percent. 3
Table 2
Annual Percent Change in Prices and Average Covered Wages,
Real Wage Differential and OASDI Reserve Ratio
Selected Periods, 1950-1982
Annual percent change
Year
1950-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-72
1973-77
1978-82

Covered
wages

Consumer
prices

5.1
3.4
5.4

2.1
1.3
3.4

5.7
7.4
8.0

4.5
7.7
9.7

OASDI
Real wage ireserve ratio
end of
differential3
periodb
(percent)
3.0
2.1

180
110

2.0
1.2
-0.3
-1.7

103
80
37
7C

SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 10, pp. 37-38 and Table 14, p. 51; and Social
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1982 (GPO 1982), Table 16, p. 21.
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages and the percen
tage increase in the annual CPI.
b. The ratio of reserves on hand at the end of one year to total expected expenditures the
next year.
c. Excludes reserves borrowed from HI trust fund.

Legislation passed in 1977 dramatically revised the social
security financing and benefit provisions in order to restore
balance to the program. However, once again the tax
schedule was set on the assumption that historical rates of
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real wage growth would reappear, that is, that the real wage
differential would averaged roughly 2.0 percent from 1978
through 1982. After 1977, however, the rate of price increase
exceeded the rate of earnings growth producing persistent
negative real wage differentials that averaged -1.7 percent
over the 1978-82 period. With inadequate revenues, the
system once again began to run annual deficits that resulted
in a rapid decline in trust fund reserves, leading to the need
for financing changes in 1983.
Long-Run Problems. Social security's long-run financing
problems began to appear after 1973, when the social securi
ty actuaries started to incorporate developing demographic
trends into the long-run projections. In the next few years,
the projected 75-year deficit worsened steadily as the flaw in
the indexing provision and high forecasted inflation rates
caused continuing increases in projected replacement rates.
The 1977 legislation stabilized replacement rates and thereby
substantially reduced the long-run deficit (from 8.2 percent
of taxable payrolls to 1.4 percent), but further revisions in
demographic assumptions and lowered real wage growth
projections after 1977 forced the 75-year deficit to increase
gradually to a level of 1.82 percent of taxable payrolls by
1982. Thus, both demographic and economic factors deter
mine the long-run financial status of the social security pro
gram.
The demographic factors are important because they
determine the number of people who will be receiving
benefits as compared to the number of workers who will be
paying taxes. In the case of those people already born, the
key demographic variable is the mortality rate. Although
most of the startling gains in life expectancy during this cen
tury are attributable to a substantial reduction in neonatal
mortality and diminution of childhood diseases, the life ex
pectancy of older persons has also increased significantly.
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The life expectancy for men at age 65 has risen from 11.9
years in 1940, when social security benefits were first paid, to
14.0 in 1980 and is projected to increase to 17.5 years by 2050
under the Trustees' intermediate mortality assumptions (see
Table 3). The comparable figures for women are more
dramatic, increasing from 13.4 years in 1940 to 18.3 in 1980
and projected to rise to 23.1 in 2050 under the intermediate
assumptions. The Trustees' pessimistic projections, which
ironically involve less likelihood of early death, assume that
by 2050 both men and women will live roughly 3.5 years
longer, while the optimistic assume they will die two years
sooner.
The size of the future workforce that will be available to
support the retired population is determined in large part by
the fertility rate (the expected average number of lifetime
births for women currently entering childbearing age). Since
1800, the fertility rate has declined persistently, although it
deviated temporarily from this trend during the 1945-60
post-World War II baby boom. After 1960, the fertility rate
resumed its decline, plummeting from its prevailing level of
3.65 to a low of 1.74 in 1976. Since 1976, the rate has fluc
tuated between 1.76 and 1.86.
Revised fertility assumptions introduced in 1974 had a ma
jor impact on the projected long-run costs of the system. For
several years prior to 1974, total fertility was assumed to
level off at an ultimate rate of 2.55 under the Trustees' in
termediate assumptions. The 1974 Trustees' Report,
however, incorporated the much lower fertility experience of
the early 1970s and projected under the intermediate
assumptions an ultimate fertility rate of 2.1, a rate that pro
duces zero population growth. The intermediate fertility rate
assumption was lowered again in the 1976 Trustees' Report,
but was then raised back to the 2.1 level in 1977, where it re
mained through 1982. The most recent social security projec-
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tions assume an ultimate fertility rate of 2.0 under the
intermediate assumptions; under the more pessimistic
scenario, the fertility assumption is 1.6 and for the optimistic
2.3.
Table 3
Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Beneficiaries per Hundred Workers
1940-1980 and Projections for 1990-2050, Selected Years

Male

Female

Beneficiaries
per 100
covered
workers

11.9
12.8
12.9
13.1
14.0

13.4
15.1
15.9
17.1
18.3

n.a.
6
20
27
31

1990
2010
2030
2050

2.01
2.30
2.30
2.30

Optimistic (Alternative I)
19.2
14.5
19.9
15.0
20.4
15.4
20.9
15.8

29
29
40
37

1990
2010
2030
2050

Intermediate (Alternative IIB)
19.9
15.1
1.90
21.3
16.1
2.00
22.2
16.8
2.00
23.1
17.5
2.00

30
33
48
50

1990
2010
2030
2050

Pessimistic (Alternative III)
20.7
15.7
1.75
23.0
17.6
1.60
24.9
19.2
1.60
26.8
20.9
1.60

31
36
58
73

Year

Fertility
rate

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

2.23
3.03
3.61
2.43
1.85

Life expectancy at age 65

SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust
Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 11, p. 40 and Table 28, pp. 75 and 76.
n.a. = not available.

21

The seemingly small differences in the fertility and mor
tality rates that are incorporated into the alternative projec
tions produce dramatic differences in the ratio of
beneficiaries to workers when compounded over a long
period of time. The intermediate demographic assumptions
imply that the number of beneficiaries per hundred workers
will increase from 30 in 1984 to 50 by the year 2050; the
lower fertility and longer life expectancy incorporated in the
pessimistic assumptions produce 73 beneficiaries for each
hundred workers, while the higher fertility and greater mor
tality in the optimistic assumptions imply 37 beneficiaries per
hundred workers. With a pay-as-you-go system, an increase
in the beneficiary/worker ratio implies an proportional in
crease in costs as a percentage of payrolls.
Long-run cost increases due to demographic shifts could
be offset, however, by greater productivity on the part of the
working population. The difficulty has been that the increas
ingly adverse demographic projections have been accom
panied by steadily worsening economic assumptions. The
projected real wage differential has been reduced several
times from 2.25 percent in 1973 to the present projection of
1.5 percent, reflecting the low levels of productivity growth
experienced during the 1970s. With only modest projected
increases in productivity, a consensus emerged that current
fertility and mortality trends would result in a significant in
crease in social security costs and that additional funds
would be required to finance the program in the twenty-first
century.

///. The Social Security Amendments of 1983
In response to the continuing deterioration in both the
short- and long-run financial position of the social security
system and the inability of Congress to agree upon a solu
tion, President Reagan in December 1981 established a
bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform.
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After more than a year of debate, the Commission finally
proposed a delicately balanced package of tax increases,
benefit cuts, and extension of coverage, which was projected
to produce $166 billion between 1983 and 1990. These
changes also eliminated two-thirds of the long-run deficit
that was projected under the intermediate assumptions to
arise after the turn of the century as the baby boom starts to
retire (see Table 4). In the process of adopting the Commis
sion's recommendations, Congress also introduced an exten
sion of the normal retirement age to close the remaining gap
between outlays and expenditures over the next 75 years.
Several other provisions were also adopted in an attempt to
stabilize the financing of the system and prevent repeated
short term crises.
Short-Run Impact: 1983-1989. The two largest producers
of additional short-term revenues, each contributing nearly
one-quarter of the total increase over the 1983-1989 period,
were the proposals to delay for six months the automatic
cost-of-living adjustment on retirement and disability
benefits4 and the provision to accelerate the OASDI payroll
tax rate increases that were already scheduled to take effect
in 1985 and 1990. 5 Another major contributor to the
system's finances, accounting for roughly 15 percent of the
total short-run revenues produced by the legislation, was the
proposal to tax 50 percent of social security benefits—the
half that is generally associated with the employer's share of
the payroll tax—for higher income recipients and to direct
the new receipts to the OASDI trust funds. 6
The legislation produced another 10 percent of the shortrun revenue increases by increasing the tax rate for selfemployed people. While in the past the self-employed have
paid taxes equal to about 75 percent of the combined
employee and employer contributions for OASDI and 50
percent for HI, under the new legislation they will pay 100
percent of the combined employee-employer rate. In order to
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allow for the portion of the self-employed tax that cor
responds to the employer's share, the self-employed will be
allowed to deduct one-half their payroll tax liability for per
sonal income tax purposes. 7
Table 4
Projected Cost Impact on the OASDI Program
of the 1983 Social Security Amendments
Cost impact
Change

1983-1989
($ billions)

Long-term
(% of payroll)

Benefit reductions/tax increases
1. Delay COLA from July to January
2. Accelerate scheduled rate increases
3. Tax 50% of OASDI benefits for
higher-income people
4. Increase tax rate for self-employed

39.4
39.4

0.30
0.03

26.6
18.5

0.61
0.19

Coverage extension
5. Cover all nonprofit employees
and new federal workers
6. Ban withdrawal of state/local employers

21.8
3.2

0.38
0.06

Other
7. Payment from general revenues for military service
credits and uncashed checks
8. Benefit changes3

17.7
-0.4

0.01
-0.13

Total

166.2

+1.38b

Extension of retirement age

-0.71
_____Total___________________________166.2_______2.09
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust
Funds (GPO, May 1983); and unpublished data.
a. Benefit changes include the following: Eliminating windfall benefits for persons with
pensions from noncovered employment; continuing benefits for remarried disabled
widow(er)s and for divorced widow(er)s; indexing deferred widow(er)'s benefits based on
the lesser of wages and prices; permitting divorced aged spouse to receive benefits when
husband is eligible; and increasing benefit rate for disabled widow(er)s aged 50-59 to 71.5
percent of primary benefit. Also included in this figure, however, is $1 billion increase in
revenue that results from accelerating state and local tax collections,
b. Total effect of reforms on trust funds as percent of payroll is not the sum of individual
percentages. Rather the total reflects the interaction of individual reforms upon one
another, including the following additional reforms: taxation of certain salary plans, alter
ing of the earnings test and adjustment of self-employment income.
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Roughly 15 percent of the total increase in short term
revenues was gained from extending coverage to new federal
employees and the uncovered workers in the nonprofit sec
tor8 and from banning future withdrawals of state and local
employers. 9 The remaining 10 percent of short term revenues
came from the proposal to make a payment from general
revenues to the OASDI trust funds to compensate the system
for gratuitous military service wage credits granted before
1983 and to provide reimbursement for social security checks
issues but never redeemed. 10
The Long Run and Extension of the Retirement Age. In
addition to raising a projected $166 billion over the period
1983-1989, the National Commission's proposals enacted in
the 1983 Amendments eliminated two-thirds of the 75-year
deficit. 11 Although the Commission members who had voted
in favor of the consensus package had agreed that the long
range deficit should be reduced to approximately zero, they
were unable to agree on a specific proposal to accomplish
this. Members selected by the Democratic leadership sup
ported an increase in contribution rates in 2010 (about 0.5
percent of earnings for the employee and a like amount for
the employer), while the remaining designees favored a
gradual increase in the retirement age.
Congress opted for extending the retirement age as a
means of eliminating the long-run deficit. As a result of the
1983 Amendments, the retirement age will rise to 66 by 2009,
then to 67 by 2027. 12 People can still elect early retirement at
62, but benefits paid to early retirees will be reduced by 25
percent in 2009 and by 30 percent in 2027. Early retirees are
currently penalized 20 percent. Raising the retirement age
reduces long-run costs by 0.71 percent of taxable payrolls,
thereby creating a small surplus in the OASDI program over
the 75-year projection period under the intermediate
assumptions.
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Revenue Stabilizers. The 1983 Amendments also contain
ed three provisions designed to improve the system*s ability
to continue paying benefits on a timely basis even during
adverse economic conditions. These include a speed-up in
monthly transfers from the Treasury, an extension of interfund borrowing, and a revised indexing procedure.
Normalizing Transfers: To protect against potential cash
flow problems created by the uneven way in which benefits
are paid and taxes are transferred to social security, Con
gress introduced a revised procedure for crediting taxes to
the trust funds. Under the previous procedures benefits were
paid on the third of the month, creating the need for high
balances in the OASDI trust fund during the first week.
Taxes, however, were transferred to the trust funds daily,
based on Treasury estimates of amounts collected. Under the
revised procedure, the Treasury is authorized to estimate
amounts to be collected in a given month and transfer such
sums to the trust funds on the first or second day of the
month. This technical procedure will help ensure that the
cash is available at the time benefit payments are made.
Extending Interfund Borrowing: Amendments to the Om
nibus Reconciliation Act, passed on December 29, 1981,
authorized borrowing through December 1982 among the
OASI, DI, and HI trust funds to finance deficits up to June
1983. The OASI fund borrowed $17.5 billion from the other
funds ($5.1 billion from DI and $12.4 billion from HI) in
November and December 1982 in order to ensure benefit
payments through June 1983. The 1983 Social Security
Amendments extended the authority for interfund borrow
ing for calendar years 1983-1987 with the provision that all
principal and interest be paid by the end of 1989. 13
Revising the COLA: As noted above, the short term fi
nancing problem in social security was entirely the result of
the unanticipated poor performance of the economy during
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the past few years. Tax rates were set on the assumption that
taxable wages would grow at the rate of increase in prices
plus an additional amount for productivity growth. After
1977, however, the traditional relationship between price
and wages was reversed and price increases exceeded wage
growth. With prices rising faster than wages, benefits, which
are linked to the consumer price index, increased faster than
payroll tax revenues, which are dependent on the growth in
wages. As a result, trust fund balances were rapidly depleted.
In an attempt to avoid this problem in the future, Con
gress established that if OASDI reserves ever drop below 15
percent (20 percent beginning in 1989) of the following year's
planned outlays, the automatic cost-of-living adjustment
would be based on the lower of the CPI increase or the in
crease in average wages until the trigger ratio is restored.
Subsequently, when the reserves reach 32 percent of outlays,
benefits would be adjusted to make up for any payments that
were less than those called for by the price adjustment. The
payback would occur only so long as reserves met the 32 per
cent standard. This change will help avoid a repetition of the
recent short-run financial crisis.

IV. Some Uncertainties
With any luck in terms of the performance of the economy
and demographic developments, the financial package
enacted in the 1983 Amendments should ensure the solvency
of the retirement and disability programs for the next 75
years. The need for luck, however, highlights the fact that
some uncertainties surround both the short-run and long-run
outlook for the social security system. These uncertainties
have little to do with the intrinsic health of the program, but
rather with the fact that tax rates are set on the basis of
assumed economic and demographic developments and the
revenues produced by these tax rates will provide inadequate
or excessive if the actual performance of the economy differs
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from that projected. In order to assess the reliability of the
projections, it is useful to identify some of the major uncer
tainties and estimate the magnitude of their potential impact
on the financial status of the program. This exercise should
provide some comfort to those who continue to worry about
the solvency of the social security program, since the analysis
reveals that potential deviations from the assumed perfor
mance would require relatively minor increases in OASDI
tax rates.
1984-1989: Economic Performance. For the period from
now through 1989, the 1983 social security package was con
structed so that the system would be adequately financed not
only under the Trustees' intermediate economic assump
tions, but also under the more pessimistic scenario. Most of
the additional revenues under the pessimistic assumptions
are attributable to the revised indexing procedure, whereby
benefits are adjusted by the lesser of increases in prices or
wages when trust fund reserves are low. The problem is that
during the 1970s the economy performed even more poorly
than the social security Trustees' pessimistic assumptions
and, therefore, a legitimate question can be raised about
whether the revenue and outlay projections for the rest of the
1980s are realistic.
In fact, no mechanism exists to answer that question; insead, the only basis for assessment is to compare the social
security assumptions with those of independent forecasters.
As of April 1983, the month the 1983 Amendments were
signed into law, the projections of the private forecasters
clustered around the social security Trustees' intermediate
and pessimistic assumptions and updated forecasts from
Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics show the
private projections bracketing these assumptions. Thus, the
social security forecasts appear to be based on reasonable
assumptions about future economic trends (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Comparison of Projections, as of Fourth Quarter 1983,
of the Real Wage Differential3 by Social Security
and Private Forecasters, 1984-1989
Social security
Intermediate Pessimistic
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

1.1
0.2
0.9
1.2
1.3
1.4

-1.8
-0.3
0.1
0.7
0.9
1.1

Private forecasters1*
Chase
DRI
0.4
0.0
0.2
1.9
1.4
1.9

-0.6
-0.2
-0.1
0.5
0.4
0.7

SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, "Possible 'Automatic
Operations' in 1984-85," memorandum (November 16, 1983), Table 1 and unpublished
data; and Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics/Interactive Data Corp., projec
tions based on data available before December 30, 1983.
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered
employment and the percentage increase in the annual CPI for all wage and salaried
workers.
b. Since the private forecasters do not project wages in covered employment, wage growth
is calculated on the basis of wages and salaries per worker in the private sector. For Chase
and DRI standard long-term forecasts were used, moderate growth and tend, respectively.

Moreover, the really difficult period for social security
financing is only the four years 1984 through 1987, since
revenues will jump markedly in 1988, when a scheduled
OASDI tax rate increase of 0.36 percent each for the
employee and employer takes effect. (Another 0.14 percent
increase becomes effective in 1990.) Little likelihood of an
economic downturn exists for 1984 and while a serious reces
sion in 1985 could cause some problems, such a development
is very unlikely. By 1986, even with a repetition of the
disasterous conditions of 1979 and 1980, the OASI and DI
trust funds should have adequate reserves to continue
payments through 1988 when the new revenues will be
available. In addition to their own reserves, the OASI and DI
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funds can borrow from the HI trust fund until 1988. The
combination of borrowing capability, substantial reserves,
and a reasonably health economic outlook makes the
possibility of another short term social security financing
crisis very unlikely. 14
1990-2020 Accumulation of Trust Fund Reserves. In
marked contrast to the 1980s, the outlook for OASDI finan
cing for the period 1990-2020 has always been favorable. The
primary reason is demographic. The low fertility rates during
the late 1920s and the 1930s will be reflected in a con
siderable reduction in the rate of increase in the population
over age 65 during the 1990s and the first decade of the
twenty-first century. While the average annual increase in
the number of persons over 65 will be about 600,000 during
the 1980s, the net increase will drop to around 400,000 a year
under the intermediate assumptions between 1990 and 2010
in spite of the improvement in the mortality rate. At the
same time, the baby boom generation born after World War
II will continue to swell the labor force. As a result, the ratio
of beneficiaries to workers, which has increased continually
since 1940, is estimated to remain stable for the next 20 to 30
years at its current level of roughly 30 beneficiaries per hun
dred workers. With a stable ratio of beneficiaries to workers,
even modest productivity gains will reduce the cost of social
security as a percent of payroll.
At the same time costs are projected to decline, revenues
are scheduled to increase since a combined employeeemployer payroll tax increase of 1.0 percent is slated to take
effect by 1990. With lower costs and higher revenues, the
retirement and disability program is projected to run
substantial annual surpluses and the ratio of assets to outlays
is estimated to increase from 38 percent in 1990 to 538 per
cent by 2020 under the intermediate assumptions. These ac
cumulated reserves are then scheduled to be drawn down to
cover annual deficits in the years between 2020 and 2057.
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During the period 1990-2020, almost no uncertainties exist
about the adequacy of social security financing. Even under
the pessimistic mortality and economic assumptions the
system will run surpluses until 2013 and have positive trust
fund balances until 2020. Should the economy perform more
poorly than the pessimistic assumptions, particularly should
the real wage differential fall below 1 percent, revenues will
still be adequate to cover benefit commitments, although not
sufficient to produce substantial surpluses.
The uncertainty surrounding social security financing dur
ing the period 1990-2020 arises then not from possible
adverse economic or demographic developments, but rather
from the possibility of congressional action. The major ques
tion is whether Congress will allow a substantial accumula
tion of assets in the OASDI trust funds or whether it will
divert scheduled payroll taxes to finance other programs or
simply not allow the 1990 rate increase to take effect. If
reserves are not accumulated during the period, then tax
rates will have to be raised after 2020 in order to finance the
annual deficits on a current cost basis. It is important to
note, however, that the rate hike that would be required if
reserves are not accumulated is fairly modest—roughly 1
percent each for the employee and employer under the in
termediate assumptions (see Table 6).
The Role of the Hospital Insurance Program. A major
obstacle to the buildup of assets in the OASDI trust fund
may be the financial requirements of the Hospital Insurance
program. Although the HI trust fund was a source of
strength during the recent financial crisis, it faces serious
financing problems in the near future. Unless further policy
changes are implemented, the Congressional Budget Office
projects the depletion of the HI fund by the end of the
decade. The deficits would be small initially, but they would
increase each year so that by 1995 the annual deficit would
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be $60 billion and the cumulative deficits would total over
$200 billion.
Table 6
Estimated Average Cost Rate, Average Total Income Rate
and Actuarial Balance for OASDI, and HI Trust Funds,
Under Three Assumptions, Selected Periods, 1983-2057

Period

Percent of projected taxable payroll
Average total
Average
Actuarial
income rate
cost rate
balance
(OASDI)

1983-2057
Pessimistic
Intermediate
Optimistic

16.56
12.84
9.81

12.87
12.73

-3.51
+ 0.02
+ 2.92

1983-2007
Pessimistic
Intermediate
Optimistic

11.44
10.66
9.22

12.53
12.50
12.45

+ 1.08
+ 1.83
+ 3.23

2008-2057
Pessimistic
Intermediate
Optimistic

15.50
12.64
9.80

13.08
12.95
12.83

-2.42
+ 0.32
+ 3.03

2033-2057
Pessimistic
Intermediate
Optimistic

22.73
15.23
10.42

13.52
13.15
12.91

-9.21
-2.08
+ 2.49

13.04

(HI)
1983-2007
Pessimistic
Intermediate
Optimistic

5.38
4.11
3.21

2.87
2.87
2.87

-2.51
- 1.24
-0.34

SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 31, pp. 79-80; and 1983 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, Table 11, p. 47.

32

Projected deficits could be substantially lower if costcontainment efforts are successful. For example, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to set
hospital reimbursement rates after 1985. If the Secretary
decided to limit the increase in payments per admission to
only 1 percentage point mre than the rate of increase of
hospital input prices, the depletion date for the HI trust fund
would be postponed until 1992 and the cumulative deficit
would amount to roughly $85 billion by 1995.
Even with successful cost-containment efforts, therefore,
some residual deficits appear almost inescapable. Hence, it is
quite possible that Congress may decide to cover some of HI
deficit by reallocating to the Hospital Insurance trust fund a
portion of the payroll tax revenues now scheduled to go into
the retirement and disability programs after 1990.
2020-2057: Demographic and Economic Assumptions.
The financial solvency of the social security program after
the year 2020 hinges crucially on demographic developments
being in line with the social security Trustees' intermediate
projections and to a somewhat lesser extent on productivity
growth producing an adequate real wage differential.
Demographic Projections: The intermediate assumption
of the social security Trustees, that the fertility rate will in
crease from its current level of 1.8 to an ultimate value of 2.0
by 2005, is slightly higher than the most recent projections by
the Census Bureau. Until October 1982, the Census Bureau's
"middle" series had assumed a long-run fertility rate of 2.1,
the rate that produces zero population growth over the longrun. Now the Census assumes that fertility rates will remain
fairly steady, increasing slightly from 1.80 to 1.96 in 2000
and then decreasing gradually to 1.9 births per woman in
2050. Supporting the somewhat higher social security projec
tions, however, is the fact that data on expected births in
dicate that young women continue to expect to have more
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than two children over their lifetimes. Thus, the social
security intermediate projection of a long-run fertility rate of
2.0 appears more likely than either the optimistic or
pessimistic projections of 2.3 or 1.6, respectively. That is, it
would be very difficult to make a convincing case for a fer
tility rate assumption substantially different from that incor
porated in the Trustees' intermediate projections. 15
Economic Assumptions: While the central projections
seem to be based on realistic demographic assumptions, they
may incorporate a somewhat optimistic assumption about
the rate of productivity growth. The intermediate projec
tions of the retirement and disability funds are based on an
assumed long-run real wage differential of 1.5 percent.
Although this number is considerably below the 3.0 percent
differential experienced in the 1950s and the 2.1 percent dur
ing the 1960s, it exceeds the average of 1.2 percent over the
last 30 years. In addition, the real wage differential of 1.5
percent implies long-run productivity gains of 2.1 percent,
which is somewhat higher than most estimates. 16
The interesting fact, however, is that the long-run costs of
the program are not all that sensitive to the real wage dif
ferential. For example, if the long-run real wage differential
were 1 percent instead of 1.5 percent, the cost of the system
in the 2020-2057 period would be roughly 1.0 percent of tax
able payrolls higher and the cost of the program over the en
tire 75-year forecasting horizon would be 0.8 percent higher.
This would mean that instead of being in long-run balance,
the system would have a 75-year deficit of 0.8 percent of tax
able payrolls. To put this deficit in perspective, it must be
compared with the total cost of the program, which would be
roughly 13.7 percent of taxable payrolls. Of this total cost,
12.9 percent would be covered by scheduled payroll taxes,
while 0.8 percent would be unfunded. In other words, the
deficit produced by a real wage differential of 1 percent
rather than 1.5 percent would amount to only 6 percent of
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program expenditures over the 75 years. Under the tradi
tional rule of thumb adopted by the social security Trustees,
the system is considered to be in close actuarial balance if
revenues are equal to plus or minus 5 percent of planned
outlays. Thus, even a substantial deviation from the assumed
real wage growth will require only a relatively modest in
crease in the payroll tax rate to restore financial balance to
the retirement and disability programs.
After 2057. To even discuss the outlook for social security
after the year 2057 verges on the ridiculous. It is comparable
to having concluded in 1909 that a program was adequately
financed through 1984 and then worrying about what was
going to happen in 1985. Nevertheless, for the sake of com
pleteness, it is probably useful to mention two factors that
pertain to the end of the forecast period. The first is that the
reserves that are scheduled to accumulate during the period
1990-2020 will be exhausted by 2057. Hence, the OASDI
payroll tax rate will have to be raised under the intermediate
assumptions by roughly 1 percentage point each for
employees and employers in the middle of the next century to
cover the costs of the program.
The second factor is that because of the mechanics of
calculating the long-run financial status of the program,
future estimates will begin to show small deficits even if the
intermediate assumptions turn out to be completely ac
curate. This will occur because the 75-year projection is a
rolling average of individual years, and as time progresses
the near-term years of projected surpluses will be replaced by
the years of deficit after 2057, the end of the current projec
tion horizon. The magnitude of this phenomenon is very
small, however, and it will probably be dwarfed by other
developments.
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V. Conclusion
Congress passed major legislation in 1983 which raised
taxes, reduced benefits, and broadened coverage in order to
provide financial balance to the social security program over
the next 75 years. The preceeding analysis indicates that the
1983 Amendments have done the job. In the critical period
between now and the 1988 rate hike, the system appears ade
quately financed even under the pessimistic set of economic
assumptions. Moreover, the economic forecasts used by
social security are consistent with those prepared by private
firms.
Between 1988 and 2020, there is little question that
revenues will be sufficient to cover promised benefits. In
deed, the major question is how large the trust funds will
become as the system experiences successive annual
surpluses. This depends somewhat on economic and
demographic developments, but the determining factor will
be Congress' willingness to deviate from pay-as-you-go
financing and allow an accumulation of reserves. If funds
are needed to finance the Hospital Insurance program, a
decision might be made to divert some of the scheduled
payroll taxes to finance HI. Even in th event of such a diver
sion, however, the system appears to have plenty of money
for the next 40 years.
After 2020, the program starts to run annual deficits and a
possibility exists that some additional financing might be re
quired if either adequate reserves are not allowed to ac
cumulate during the 1990-2020 period or the real wage dif
ferential turns out to be lower than projected. Even if either
of these events should occur, however, the size of the tax in
crease that would be required to compensate appears
relatively modest—perhaps 1 percent each for the employee
and employer. Hence, the financing of the retirement and
disability programs appears well under control for the
foreseeable future.
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NOTES
1. This discussion of the effect of forecasting errors is based on a presen
tation by Lawrence H. Thompson, "Social Security Financing: Recent
Problems and Current Uncertainties," prepared for annual meeting of
Industrial Relations Research Association, San Francisco, December 30,
1983 and on Dwight K. Bartlett and Joseph A. Applebaum, "Economic
Forecasting: Effect of Errors on OASDI Fund Ratios," Social Security
Bulletin 45 (1) (January 1982), pp. 9-14.
2. Because of the time lag in adjusting benefits, the level of inflation does
have a small impact on the cost of the system even with a constant real
wage differential. For example, the 75-year deficit would range from
-0.33 percent of taxable payrolls to -(-0.36 percent as the underlying in
flation rate ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent even with a constant real
wage differential of 1.5 percent.
3. Other factors contributing to social security's financial problems were
a higher-than-expected unemployment rate which further reduced
revenues and an unprecedented increase in disability claims.
4. Since 1975 cost-of-living adjustments were made annually in June
(payable in July) to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI),
measured by the first quarter of the current year over the first quarter of
the previous year. The legislation shifted the 1983 COLA from June to
December and provided that all subsequent increases be awarded in
December (payable in January), based on the elevel of the CPI in the
third quarter of that year over the level in the third quarter of the
previous year.
5. The 1983 legislation moved the scheduled 1985 OASDI rate increase to
1984 and part of the scheduled 1990 increase to 1988. As a result, the
1984 OASDI tax is 5.7 percent each for employers and employees and is
slated to rise to 6.06 percent in 1988 and 6.2 percent in 1990. With a HI
tax of 1.45 percent beginning in 1986, the total social security payroll tax
will rise from its present level of 7.0 percent to 7.51 percent in 1988 and
7.65 percent in 1990. In order to postpone the impact of the 1984 increase
until 1985, however, the legislation provided employees a credit of 0.3
percent of taxable wages so that net OASDI tax remains unchanged at
5.4 percent for 1984.
6. One-half of social security benefits are subject to taxation if 50 per
cent of the benefits, combined with other income plus certain nontaxable
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income, exceed $32,000 in the case of a married couple and $25,000 for
single individuals.
7. The deduction becomes effective in 1990. In the interim, the tax in
crease will be accompanied by a tax credit of 2.7 percent of taxable earn
ings in 1984, 2.3 percent in 1985 and 2 percent in 1986 through 1989.
8. Before the 1983 Amendments, the social security system covered 90
percent of jobs in paid employment. The 10 percent of workers who were
not covered by social security included most federal civilian workers (2.4
out of 2.7 million), about 30 percent of state and local employees (ap
proximately 3 million), and 15 to 20 percent of employees of nonprofit
organizations (up to 1 million). The 1983 Amendments extended
coverage to all newly hired federal civilian employees and to uncovered
workers in nonprofit institutions. For these groups, this provision not
only eliminates the windfall component of benefits that arises when
formerly uncovered workers have minimum coverage and profit from
social security's progressive benefit formula, but also improves the pro
tection for many workers, particularly in the area of disability and sur
vivors insurance. The windfall component for those groups who con
tinue to remain uncovered is partially eliminated in the legislation by
modifying the benefit formula for persons with pensions from noncovered employment.
9. Since 1950 social security coverage for employees of the states and
localities has been available on a voluntary basis through agreements be
tween the political entity and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser
vices. States could voluntarily terminate coverage with two years' ad
vanced notice. Until the mid-1970s the number of employees leaving the
system was always exceeded by the number of newly covered
employees—in most years by 50,000 or more. After 1975, however, the
number of workers for whom coverage was terminated exceeded the
number of newly covered employees. These terminations not only reduc
ed the payroll tax base, but also caused some employees to lose protec
tion and created resentment on the part of other workers who were
covered on a mandatory basis. To alleviate these problems, the 1983
Amendments prohibited state and local governments from terminating
coverage after April 14, 1983.
10. The military have been covered under social security since 1957, but
military personnel pay contributions only on the cash paid to them. The
government pays the costs of the benefit credits made on the basis of
nonpecuniary allowances for room and board. However, the government
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did not make current payments for these credits, but rather transferred
the money to the social security trust funds only when the benefits were
paid. Moreover, prior to 1957, free credits of $160 per month were
granted for service in the armed forces. These credits, too, were paid on
ly after the benefits were awarded, and the cost was amortized over a
long period of time. The 1983 Amendments provided for the OASDI
trust funds to receive a lump-sum payment from the Treasury to make up
for the back amounts owed by the government. In the future the OASDI
trust funds will be reimbursed on a current basis for the employee and
employer taxes on the benefit credits made in lieu of allowances for room
and board.
11. The relative importance of the specific proposals on long-run costs
and revenues, however, differed somewhat from their impact on the
system in the short run. The change that had the greatest long range ef
fect was the proposal to tax one-half of social security benefits. While the
income limits initially restrict the taxation to less than 10 percent of the
population, eventually about half of all beneficiaries will be affected.
The proposal to bring employees of nonprofit institutions and newly
hired federal workers under social security also has a favorable long
range impact. The saving arises because an estimated 73 percent of those
involved would have qualified for sizable social security benefits as a
result of other employment even without the extension of coverage.
Also, federal employees tend to have wages that are higher than average
and, therefore, are entitled to less heavily weighted benefits.
12. Specifically, the age for full benefits will be increased to 66 by two
months a year for six years so that provision would be fully effective
beginning with those attaining age 62 in 2005 (66 in 2009); maintained at
age 66 for people reaching are 62 in 2006-2016; increased by two months
a year for people reaching age 62 in 2017-2022; and maintained at age 67
for people reaching 62 after 2022.
13. The 1983 legislation puts restrictions on interfund borrowing, par
ticularly: 1) interest must be paid monthly on any outstanding loans;
2) no fund can borrow from the other in any month in which the other's
trust fund ratio is under 10 percent; 3) in 1983-1987, each fund must
repay loans whenever its fund ratio at yearend exceeds 15 percent; and
4) in 1988-1989, the loan balance outstanding at the end of 1987 must be
repaid in 24 equal monthly payments.
14. Some speculation has emerged that trust fund reserves may fall
slightly below 15 percent in 1984 or 1985, triggering the revised indexing

39
procedure. Even if this should occur, it would probably have no effect on
benefits, since wages will almost certainly rise faster than prices. Hence,
no changes in benefits or taxes are likely in the short run.
15. On the other hand, the enormous fluctuation experienced in fertility
trends would argue against being too complacent about any projection of
future fertility rates. The hazards of forecasting population growth can
be easily demonstrated by historical experience. In 1943 it was
authoritatively estimated that the 1980 United States population would
be perhaps as low as 146 million, or perhaps be as high as 179 million; in
1958 the corresponding low and high forecasts of the 1975 population
were 231 million and 273 million; the event—a population of 228
million—confounded both these projections. See Warren S. Thompson
and P.K. Whelpten, "Estimates of the Future Population of the United
States, 1940 to 2000," paper presented for the National Resources Plan
ning Board (1943) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United
States, by Age and Sex, 1960 to 1980," series P-25, No. 187 (GPO,
1958).
16. An ultimate rate of productivity gains of 2.1 percent per year was
derived from the projected real-wage differential of 1.5 percent per year
by increasing it by 0.3 percent for the relative annual growth of fringe
benefits; 0.2 percent for the average number of hours worked per week;
and 0.1 percent for the average number of weeks worked per year.
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The Economics of Aging*
Doomsday or Shangrila?
James H. Schulz
Brandeis University

The well-known social commentator Gunnar Myrdal
(1963), writing in the early Sixties, had this to say about the
elderly in America:
The treatment of old people in America, many of
whom have a hard life behind them, is
remarkable. . . [This is illustrated by] the terrifying
extent to which old people are left in poverty and
destitution. ... It cannot possibly be the con
sidered opinion of the majority of Americans that
so many of those who in America are often called
"senior citizens" should be left in misery, squalor,
and often forbidding loneliness, unattended though
they are in need of care. The situation is overripe
for a radical reform of the old age security system.
Contrast Myrdal's comment with a recent story that ap
peared in the Washington Post:
A new Census Bureau study shows that the elderly
in this country are much better off than previously
believed and, in fact, are better off than the average
American. . . .
The article by Spencer Rich (1983) in the Washington Post
goes on to describe how the per capita, after-tax income of
*This presentation was based on an article by James Schulz published in Charles M. Gaitz,
et al., Aging 2000: Our Health Care Destiny, Vol. II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985),
and is reprinted with permission.
41

42

the elderly was $6,300 in 1980 versus $5,964 for the popula
tion as a whole.
Looking at these new Census Bureau findings and a
number of other recent studies, one can begin to see the
outlines of a very fundamental change with regard to the
economic status of the elderly. From a statistical point of
view, the elderly in this country are beginning to look a lot
like the rest of the population: some very rich, lots with ade
quate income, lots more with very modest incomes (often
near poverty), and a significant minority still destitute. This
is very different from the past when most were destitute.
The past three decades have been marked by steady im
provements in the economic situation of the elderly. Pension
coverage has spread rapidly, real benefit levels have increas
ed, and health protection is generally financially obtainable.
Moreover, the general economic prosperity of the postWorld War II period (that is, up until recently) has served to
facilitate among those middle-aged and older the accumula
tion of an impressive stock of economic wealth in the form
of housing, durables, and pension accurals.
But just when we thought the problem of providing ade
quate income in retirement for most elderly was solved, a
whole new set of uncertainties arose:
1. Life-Threatening Economic Instability. I say "lifethreatening" as a way of dramatizing the differences in the
character of the macro problems that suddenly appeared in
the Seventies. Inflation and unemployment unexpectedly
became both more severe and of longer duration—to the ex
tent that the resulting economic deprivation, mental stress,
inadequate medical care, and malnutrition threatened life
itself for a much broader spectrum of the American popula
tion.
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As families attempted to cope with the harsh realities of
this economic instability, few realized (or had the time or in
clination to think about) the simultaneous erosion of the
base for their retirement security that was also occurring.
Wealth in housing and consumer durables deteriorated. And
a private pension system, designed to reward long-term
workers at the expense of those who lose or change jobs,
proceeded to wipe out billions of dollars in potential pension
accruals as millions of workers changed jobs without vested
pension rights. And probably what is more serious is the
gradual, invisible erosion of pension benefit rights that will
take place over the coming years. The forced mobility of the
Seventies and Eighties also produced a gigantic pool of pen
sion benefit accruals for those job changers fortunate
enough to be eligible for vesting. But since these accruals are
not indexed, they are highly vulnerable to monetary
depreciation from the inflation that can be expected in the
years ahead. Few people today (even policymakers) are sen
sitive to this problem. Few see that this is the great retirement
"legacy" of the Carter-Reagan years: lost pension benefits.
Instead, most attention has been focused on social security,
the next uncertainty to be discussed.
2. Chaotic Social Security Financing. It is almost amusing
to look back over the social security events of the recent past:
a nation bumbling along from one social security financial
crisis to another, like a little mom and pop grocery store
always on the brink of bankruptcy. What we have witnessed
is one of the great social programs of the richest country in
the world seemingly almost brought to its knees by the
economic instability discussed above. The result: cries of
anguish, much handwringing, and finally a financial "fix"
until the next crisis arises.
To me, a pension expert who has given years of attention
to pension financing issues, events seem more the result of
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political maneuvering than the product of fundamental
economic problems. But to others, the problems (both
economic and political) seem very real. And for the first time
since it was established, support for social security seems in
doubt as confidence deteriorates among policymakers and
program participants. What was once unthinkable—major
cutbacks—have become a reality: benefit cuts, benefit taxa
tion, and a scheduled rise in the retirement age.
For purposes of this paper, then, it only remains to ask the
question: if social security is in a state of change, what can be
counted on? Obviously this new uncertainty makes it dif
ficult to plan for the future.
3. The Early Retirement Bomb. For many years now
analysts have pointed with great anxiety to the dramatic
declines in labor force participation among the older popula
tion. For reasons we summarize below, many have referred
to this social phenomenon as a ticking bomb that might ex
plode in the nation's face at some future time.
It is important to distinguish the growing interest and
ability to retire in general from the phenomenon of exercis
ing the retirement option at increasingly early ages. The
"right to retire" is not what is at issue. Rather the issue is the
age of election and who will pay the costs. For example, ac
tuaries point out that pension costs increase by about 50 per
cent once the normal age of retirement is reduced from age
65 to age 60.
Yet, throughout the country, powerful forces are at work
to remove people from the labor force before age 65. In
creasing numbers of workers are retiring under the social
security early retirement option. Federal employees can
retire on full benefits at age 55 with 30 years of service; in
fact, the President's Commission on Pension Policy reported
that 59 percent of retiring male civil service servants (fiscal
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1978) were age 60 or younger. Most state and local govern
ment employee plans also have very liberal retirement provi
sions. Early retirement is usually possible after 20 to 30 years
of service—often as early as age 50 or 55.
Less well known are the retirement options provided under
private pension plans. The generous provisions of the big
plans—for example, in the auto industry—are well known.
Few data are published, however, on the hundreds of
thousands of plans in other industries. One recent study of
pension plans by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980),
has found that more than half of covered workers were eligi
ble to receive normal retirement benefits before age 65. And
almost a third were eligible for normal benefits at age 60 or
earlier!
Another study of defined benefit plans covering about 23
million workers in 1974 (Schulz, et al., 1980) shows that 70
percent of these workers were eligible for early retirement
benefits at age 60 (provided service requirements, if any,
were met). Over half could retire as early as age 55, and 15
percent were in plans with even earlier eligibility ages (or no
age requirement at all).
But these numbers do not tell the whole story. More than
90 percent of all workers covered by private pensions are in
plans having "early retirement" options. When a worker
retires early, that is before the " normal" retirement age, the
benefit is usually reduced. A large number of employers,
however, encourage their employees to retire early by absorb
ing some of the costs of paying pensions over a longer period
of time. Thus, while some plans reduce benefits by the full
actuarial discount, many plans, in effect, give actuarial
bonuses to workers who retire early.
The study of defined benefit plans in 1974 indicated that
powerful economic incentives are provided in many plans.
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For example, there were about seven million workers in 1974
covered by plans permitting their retirement at age 60 with
less than a full actuarial reduction in benefits.
Thus, we see that social security is not the sole force
pushing workers into retirement. Certainly social security in
come, when it becomes available, encourages workers to
retire. But for many workers it is military, federal,
state/local, or private plans that make it possible to retire at
increasingly early ages.
Pensions have become an important tool of personnel
management, especially in dealing with excess labor situa
tions. As Juanita Kreps (1977) pointed out a few years ago,
"retirement, a relatively new lifestage, has quickly become
a ... device for balancing the number of job seekers with
the demand for workers at going rates of pay." But make no
mistake, early retirement is also very popular with unions
and the workers themselves.
This trend of early retirement raises new uncertainties. To
the extent that early retirement benefits are reduced benefits,
will the resulting retirement income be adequate? Will the
lower benefits ultimately trigger demands for higher ones?
Will meeting the costs of paying pension benefits over in
creasing periods of time create financing problems for public
and private pension sponsors—threatening the viability of
the pension plans themselves? Since the costs of early retire
ment policies are relatively low but grow rapidly over time
(as the trend continues and spreads), some see this situation
akin to a quiet bomb that is currently dormant but capable
of suddenly exploding sometime in the future. Already many
see social security costs out of control. Concern about
private pension costs may soon follow.
Given these uncertainties (economic instability, problems
of social security financing, and the trend toward early
retirement), what can we say about the future? Here we find
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very little agreement among analysts. Of course, such a state
of affairs is not too surprising. We have learned not to be too
surprised by the unpredictable, especially given the large
number of unknown factors surrounding a social
phenomenon like "the economics of aging." Still, for those
who have taken more than a passing interest in this area, the
current situation represents a significant and somewhat
unexpected watershed.
Some analysts see us at the beginning of a long period of
economic stagnation and decline. Others see current
economic problems as just another temporary setback in the
long-run history of economic growth and the ever-rising pros
perity that has characterized the American economy for
more than a century. Economic policies for the aging and
ultimately the future economic status of the aged depend
critically on which viewpoint is the more realistic.
Rather than taking sides in this dispute, it may be more
useful at this point to enumerate some of the key assump
tions that lie behind the two very different points of view.
Our ability to finance economic programs for the aged in
future years will be influenced greatly by the following fac
tors:
1. The Growth of Real Wages. Until the late Sixties the
growth in American productivity was relatively high for
most of the post-World War II period. Since then, however,
the rate has slackened and in recent years the slowdown has
been quite dramatic. Moreover, this downturn has not been
confined to a few special industries but has been experienced
by a very broad spectrum of industries in the United States.
Despite much research, economists have not been able to
satisfactorily explain the changes in productivity that have
taken place and, as a result, there is currently a great deal of
uncertainty with regard to what is likely to happen in the
years ahead.
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Pessimistic projections generally assume that recent ex
perience results from fundamental changes in the economy
that are not likely to change quickly. They therefore assume
that real wage increases based on productivity gains will be
very low, averaging significantly less than 1.0 percent per
year.
Optimistic projections, in contrast, assume that the recent
experience is transient and in large part associated with the
unexpected economic shocks of the last couple of
decades—war, OPEC, crop failures, etc. These projections
assume a return to rates closer to those of the 1940-60 period
and real wages soon increasing between 1.0 and 2.0 percent
per year.
2. Unemployment. Intimately relatd to productivity and
growth is the level of employment. In addition to the general
economic stagnation depressing employment opportunities,
pessimists point to an apparent increase in structural prob
lems associated with the American labor force as its age, sex,
and race composition changes dramatically and as we shift
away from manufacturing production and toward services.
Thus, pessimistic projections assume unemployment will not
decline to the earlier low levels but will range between 6 and 8
percent (high by historical standards). Optimistic projections
assume rates only slightly higher than those of "better
times"—declining to below 6 percent.
3. Fertility Rates and Mortality. We have witnessed wide
fluctuations in fertility over the past century, creating an
unevenness in the population structure and resulting dif
ficulties in planning (for housing, schools, pensions, etc.)
The sharp decline in fertility following the "baby boom" of
the late Forties and early Fifties is currently the cause of
serious concern with regard to the costs of the elderly
population in the 21st century. But trends in fertility over the
next several decades are also important, since they will in
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great part determine the number of working-age persons
available when the "baby boom" retires.
While most demographers continue to stress the volatility,
and hence unpredictability, of future fertility, the projec
tions we make now must guess as to the likely trends.
Pessimistic projections assume that fertility will continue to
fall to about 1.6-1.7 children per woman; while the op
timistic ones assume fertility will increase slightly to 2.1-2.4
births per woman. (All projections fail to include illegal im
migration.)
Remaining life expectance at age 65 is currently about 18.0
years for women and 14.0 years for men, up from 1940 by
four and two years respectively. For projection purposes, the
major breakthroughs in prolonging life that some predict are
generally not made a part of the projections, and almost all
projections generally assume some continuing but gradual
improvement in mortaility experience at the later ages. Thus,
the optimistic and pessimistic projections differ only by rate
of improvement in life expectancy assumed, and this dif
ference is typically small.
4. Private Pensions. Private pensions have grown
dramatically during the post-World War II period—in
coverage, in types of protection, and in benefit levels provid
ed. Optimistic projections see this mechanism for income in
old-age continuing to increase in importance. With liberaliz
ed tax provisions for IRAs and a variety of new pension op
tions (e.g., 401 (K) cash-or-deferred plans), private pension
coverage—and hence pension benefits—are assumed to in
crease significantly. In contrast, the pessimistic projections
see pension coverage growing slowly (perhaps even declin
ing) as a result of (a) government regulations which make
pensions a much less flexible management tool and raise ad
ministrative expenses, (b) higher benefit costs arising from
continuing demands to liberalize benefits, and (c) escalating
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premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to
protect against plan termination resulting from industry, and
hence plan, instability.
5. Health Care Costs. There is now growing awareness
among analysts and policymakers that the rapid rise in
health care costs of the recent past is not likely to abate in the
years to come. With regard to the elderly, most of the atten
tion is focused on Medicare, which currently finances about
45 percent of their health care costs and most of acute care
expenses. Since its enactment, Medicare expenditures have
grown at a rate far faster than the other social security pro
grams. In early 1983, the White House issued statistics to
support President Reagan's "health care incentive reform
proposal." "This year," said the fact sheet, "Medicare and
Medicaid will spend more every two weeks than they did dur
ing the entire year of 1966, their first full year of operation"
(White House, 1983). If the early retirement bomb is
threatening us, many would argue that the Medicare bomb
has already exploded, and the only argument is over how
many more will follow.
Moreover, there seems to be general agreement among
analysts that, in the absence of intervention, Medicare costs
will continue to accelerate in future years. And many think
that only very fundamental and radical changes in our health
care delivery system will have any appreciable effect on
future costs trends. In their Annual Report for 1983, the
Trustees of the Social Security Administration project ("im
mediate" assumptions) that Medicare costs will continue
to grow by 8 to 13 percent over the next two
decades—significantly faster than the increase in revenues
from taxable payrolls. The resulting costs (and deficits) are
huge by any standard of comparison.
The Trustees attribute slightly over half of the annual
growth in health costs to economic and demographic factors.

51

But the rest is expected to result from the continuing cost
pressures within the health care industry itself—wage setting,
insurance disincentives, and the costs of new technology.
Peterson (1983) warns, for example, that the "... new
medical technologies are priming the HI [Medicare] program
for a cost explosion without precedent. ..." And Alan
Greenspan—testifying before the Subcommittee on Social
Security, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means
(February 1, 1983) as Chairman of the National Commission
on Social Security Reform—warns: "We cannot substantial
ly constrain the cost of Medicare unless we slow the im
provements in technology (a dubious goal) or choose not to
employ the technology that is currently available. These deci
sions, of course, would raise very difficult ethical and moral
questions."
Again, projecting future costs becomes a seemingly im
possible exercise. Munnell (1983), arguing against the
pessimistic projections of Peterson, counters in the following
way:
Outlays for HI [Medicare] today account for only
18 percent of total expenditures under the social
security program; it is difficult to believe that we
will allow the HI program to grow to a point where
the cost for hospital insurance (20 percent of tax
able payrolls) roughly equals the total cost to sup
port the aged, disabled, their dependents and sur
vivors (24 percent of payrolls). [Emphasis added.]
Thus, given agreement over the need for cost constraint, the
optimists and pessimists tend to differ on how soon and how
much we will change our health care system.
It is tempting to close by throwing up one's hands in
frustration and exclaiming, "Who knows what the future
will bring?" As our survey of the key factors has shown,
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there is clearly much intellectual justification for uncertain
ty—and anxiety!
Instead, I want to close by adding a reactive note of cau
tion. In recent years, good economic news has been virtually
nonexistent. For this and other reasons it is quite clear that
the pessimistic projections and the problems they portend
are being taken very seriously these days by "the people that
count." Given the seriousness in recent years of our general
economic problems and a number of major problems arising
in connection with old-age and disability pensions, state and
local pension financing, private pension reinsurance, and
Medicare/Medicaid—the possibility of continuing and in
creasing problems is not likely to be ignored.
And for a number of years now a variety of "solutions"
or remedial steps have been proposed. The changes are
almost all pointed in one direction—drastic cutbacks in
benefits to reduce social security costs. As I have pointed out
previously (Schluz 1983), the logical question that follows
from such proposed action is: What else changes in reaction
to cutbacks in social security (i.e., what takes the place of
social security)?
In examining the ability of alternatives to pick up the slack
from a pared down social security program, we should not
ignore economic history. Despite what Martha Derthick
(1979) says about bureaucratic elites engineering the expan
sion of social security, the development of OASDHI was to a
very large extent a reaction to the failure of the alter
natives—namely "employment of the old" and "providing
for old age through personal savings." Both these alter
natives are largely untenable due to the vicissitudes of our
economic system over the years:
a)

past periods of unemployment and inflation that have
made preparation for retirement (i.e., financial plan-
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ning) extremely difficult for individuals (if not im
possible);
b)

an inability to achieve sustained full
employment—except in periods when the nation was
preparing, fighting, or recovering from war—causing
the government to actively discourage employment by
older workers and to develop pension mechanisms
that encourage retirement; and

c)

both social security and private pensions with a long
history as tools of business management to deal with
cyclical and long-term shifts in demand (see, e.g.,
Graebner 1980).

What then are the alternatives proposed today? Not surpris
ingly, we find that they are the same as in the past: private
saving, private insurance, and employment of the old.
Thus, there is a high probability that the solutions being
proposed today are simplistic and unworkable. If we cut
back social security drastically, we are likely to see the
economic status of the elderly decline over time. More im
portant, this decline will fall disproportionately on the disadvantaged segments of the population—low income persons,
women, and minorities who now depend almost entirely on
social security for their support in old age.
The long term implications of this are quite serious. As
William Graebner has recently argued, the elderly may be
viewed by our society as a residual group to remain in or
move out of the labor force, according to the
macroeconomic situation:
If elderly people of the turn of the century could
compare notes with those of us approaching this
century's end, the two generations might well con-
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elude that, whatever else has changed, the fate of
the elderly remains the same: to serve the needs of
other age groups and to be retired, or put back to
work in the interest of someone else's conception of
the general welfare (Graebner 1983).
If that is true, then it is quite unlikely that many people in the
future can actually count on the rosy retirement period (the
Shangrila) so much the fashion today in the stories of the
media and the speeches of politicians.
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Retirement Incentives—
the Carrot and the Stick*
Why No One Works
Beyond 65 Anymore
Joseph F. Quinn
Boston University

Introduction
The topic of this year's Economic Lecture series is the
Economics of Aging. I am delighted with this choice of
topic. It is an extremely interesting, important, and timely
one, and it is one of the few issues on which I have any exper
tise. There are many aspects of the economics of aging that
you will hear discussed this year. I have chosen only one of
them, the retirement decision—"Why No One Works
Beyond 65 Anymore: the Carrot and the Stick."
The presentation has four parts. I will first point out that
something is happening. Retirement patterns have changed,
and changed dramatically. Second, I will speak briefly about
why this is important. Third, I will ask why this is occurring
and finally, what we can do about it.
I will concentrate on the third of these. Why is it that these
changes in retirement patterns are occurring? Why are peo*Much of this presentation was drawn from an article by Richard V. Burkhauser (Vanderbilt University) and Joseph F. Quinn, "Influencing Retirement Behavior: A Key Issue for
Social Security," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Fall 1983. More technical
background material can be found in two earlier papers by the same authors, "Is Man
datory Retirement Overrated? Evidence from the 1970's," Journal of Human Resources,
Summer 1983 and "The Effect of Pension Plans on the Pattern of Life-Cycle Compensa
tion," in The Measurement of Labor Cost (Jack Triplett, editor), NBER Studies in Income
and Wealth, Volume 48, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
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pie retiring earlier than they used to? I will emphasize only
one component of the answer to what is obviously a very
complex question. That component concerns economic in
centives—incentives imbedded in our social security and pen
sion systems, incentives that induce retirement, I will argue,
by penalizing the work effort of older workers. Social securi
ty and employer pensions impose pay cuts, large pay cuts in
some cases, on older workers. These cuts do not occur
through the paycheck, but through a much more subtle but
no less effective mechanism. Many older workers respond
exactly how you might expect to the pay cuts—they stop
working and retire.

Retirement Trends
Table 1 lays out the facts to be explained—the mystery to
be solved. It includes longitudinal data on labor force par
ticipation rates from 1950 to 1981, by age and by sex. I draw
your attention to the last two columns—data for men and
women aged 55-64 and 65 and over. You will notice here a
remarkable demographic trend. As recently as 1950, nearly
half of American men over 64 were still in the labor force.
A mere 30 years later, that proportion is down to less than
1 in 5.
Obviously, my title is a bit inaccurate. It is not true that
nobody works beyond 65 anymore, but it is true that what
was once a very common phenomenon, men over 65 work
ing, is now relatively rare.
For the next category of men, 55-64, people of early retire
ment age, the pattern is similar though less dramatic. Within
these same 30 years, the proportion still in the labor force
has dropped from near 90 percent to near 70 percent.
Something is happening.
As you can see, the statistics for women are quite dif
ferent. The reason is that there are two trends underway
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simultaneously. First, folks are retiring earlier. But second,
more women are working than used to. These trends tend to
offset each other for women over 65. The participation rate
has stayed in the 8 to 10 percent range since 1950. For
women of early retirement age, the increased labor force par
ticipation has dominated the early retirement trend, and the
proportion working has grown from 27 to 41 percent.
Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rates
by Age and Sex
25-34

35-44

Age
45-54

Males
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1981

96.2
97.6
97.5
97.3
96.4
95.2
94.9

97.6
98.1
97.7
97.3
96.9
95.6
95.4

95.8
96.5
95.7
95.6
94.3
92.1
91.4

86.9
87.9
86.8
84.6
83.0
75.6
70.6

45.8
39.6
33.1
27.9
26.8
21.6
18.4

Females
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1981

34.0
34.9
36.0
38.5
45.0
54.9
66.7

39.1
41.6
43.4
46.1
51.1
55.8
66.8

38.0
43.8
49.8
50.9
54.4
54.6
61.1

27.0
32.5
37.2
41.1
43.0
40.9
41.4

9.7
10.6
10.8
10.0
9.7
8.2
8.0

55-64

65 +

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President
(1982).

Chart 1 is a picture of the same phenomenon, except that
it uses individual ages rather than broad categories. If we
define normal retirement age as the age at which half of the
cohort are out of the labor force, we can use this chart to
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Chart 1
Labor Force Participation Rates
Males and Females, 1950 to 1982
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show what has happened to normal retirement age over these
years. Back in 1950, for example, it was not until age 70 that
half the men were out of the labor force. By 1970, 20 years
later, 65 was the age at which half the men had withdrawn.
Today that age is below 63. As you have seen, the picture for
women is different. Despite a downturn in the early 1970s, a
time, by the way, when social security benefits rose
dramatically in real terms, the general trend for women has
been up or steady, even in the oldest categories.
When one aggregates men and women, which I have not
done here, the conclusion is clear: people are retiring earlier
than they used to. Our mission, should we decide to accept
it, is to find out why people retire when they do. It may be
that people retire when they have to, when debilitating health
problems or mandatory retirement rules drive them from
their jobs. On the other hand, people may retire when they
choose to. They face financial incentives that encourage
retirement, and many may be induced to do so.

A Source of Concern?
My second question is "why is this an issue?"—a polite
way of asking "who cares?" Until recently, I think there was
no particular alarm over these retirement trends. If anything,
they were applauded. One of the goals of the early architects
of the social security system, it has been argued, was to in
duce older workers out of the very weak labor markets of the
1930s.
But that goal, I suspect, faded during the war years and
the more prosperous decades that followed. Nonetheless,
this trend towards early retirement was viewed as a logical
development in an increasingly wealthy society. Some of this
wealth was spent on leisure, and some of this leisure was
taken in the form of early retirement.
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But this retirement trend is no longer viewed as benign for
at least two reasons. One is the financial crisis facing social
security. The social security trust funds are basically nonexis
tent these days. Current receipts from social security con
tributors are paid directly to current recipients. It is a pay-asyou-go system. There is nothing wrong with a pay-as-you-go
system as long as future receipts are adequate to meet future
obligations. But this was recently not the case.
Some of the social security funding crisis was a temporary
phenomenon due to the recessionary years of the 1970s—if
you are willing to call more than a decade of recession tem
porary. But part of the crisis is also due to these trends
towards early retirement and to the early receipt of benefits
by recipients.
The other reason for concern is anything but temporary. It
derives from the well-known demographic fact that the age
structure of America is changing. Currently, about 11 per
cent of our population is 65 or older. By 2025, this will grow
to between 17 and 20 percent. The whole country will soon
look like Florida, not with respect to winter weather, unfor
tunately for you Michigan residents, but with respect to the
age distribution.
Even without changing retirement patterns, fewer workers
per retiree would put strains on the social security system,
implying either higher taxes for contributors, lower benefits
for recipients, or both. When this demographic trend is com
bined with the fact that people are retiring earlier, the prob
lems are compounded.
I think that older workers will be very much needed in the
labor force of the future because they will be a larger propor
tion of the population. I fear that the elderly may be unwill
ing to work unless the financial incentives that I will discuss
this evening are changed.
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Retirement Determinants
In 1977, Congress changed the age of earliest mandatory
retirement from 65 to 70. With a couple of minor exceptions,
it is now illegal to have a mandatory retirement prior to age
70. Many people, including President Reagan and Rep.
Claude Pepper, a leading spokesman for older American in
Congress, favor outlawing mandatory retirement altogether.
The entire concept may be legislated out of existence.
An interesting research question is whether this would
make a difference. At first blush, it appears that it would.
Prior to 1977, mandatory retirement provisions were a
widespread phenomenon in the U.S. Between 40 and 50 per
cent of workers faced them, and many people retired at their
mandatory retirement age. When one compares the behavior
of people with and without mandatory retirement, their
behavior is quite different.
Richard Burkhauser and I followed a sample of employed
older workers (aged 62 to 64 in 1983, drawn from the Social
Security Administration's Retirement History Study (RHS))
over a two-year period during which some of them faced
mandatory retirement. Of those who did, only 17 percent
were still working in 1975. Of those who did not face man
datory retirement, nearly 60 percent were still employed.
This is a big difference in behavior and a large potential
mandatory retirement effect.
But coincidence does not imply causation. I will argue
tonight that there are important financial incentives that go
into effect (or increase in magnitude) at exactly the same
time that mandatory retirement occurs. It is difficult to say
without considerable investigation that mandatory retire
ment was the reason why these people retired when they did.
It is not easy to discern "who dunnit?" or in this case "what
dunnit?"
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Social security, pensions and mandatory retirement are all
very closely intertwined. It is extremely important to under
stand how each of these determinants (and others, such as
health, marital status, attitudes and expectations) influence
the retirement decision. Why is it important? If mandatory
retirement was forcing people out of the labor force at age
65, then a change in the mandatory retirement law, as we had
in 1977, or its outright elimination will have a substantial im
pact on aggregate behavior. On the other hand, if it was not
mandatory retirement but other factors that occur at the
same time, then changing the mandatory retirement law will
have very little effect on retirement trends.
Mandatory retirement and pensions tend to come hand
and hand. In the sample of older workers mentioned above,
nearly all (91 percent) of those facing mandatory retirement
also had pensions. Most became eligible at exactly the same
time as mandatory retirement and most were eligible for full
rather than reduced benefits at that time. On the other hand,
of those people who were not subject to mandatory retire
ment, fewer than half (47 percent) had pensions. If pensions
induce people to retire, and I think they do, then much of
what may look like a mandatory retirement effect may be the
impact of these pensions.
Mandatory retirement and social security are even easier
to link. The age of full social security eligibility is age 65.
That is also the age, we will see, when a very important
change in the social security law occurs. This change will
play a key role in solving the mystery below.
Age 65 is important for another reason. Prior to 1977, this
was by far the most popular age for mandatory retirement.
If social security induces people to retire, and I think it does,
much of its effect might also be attributed to mandatory
retirement.
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Let's look at the modus operand! of our suspects. Man
datory retirement is the simplest, although there are
subtleties in some of the provisions. They generally state that
an individual must leave the job when turning a certain age,
or at the end of that calendar year. It is a straightforward
and blunt instrument. It is the "stick" of the title of this
talk.
Social security and employer pensions, on the other hand,
are promises of income streams in the future. They are very
complicated promises, and have many important dimen
sions, such as the age of eligibility, the size of the retirement
benefit, whether that amount is adjusted for inflation after
retirement, and what happens to that amount if one decides
to delay retirement and continue working.
All of these aspects of the retirement contract are impor
tant determinants of how valuable these promises are. In em
pirical work, one must describe these complicated ar
rangements in a simple summary form. How big are an in
dividual's pension and social security rights? The most
popular way to answer this question is in terms of the annual
benefit; for example, $6,000 per year. But that answer ig
nores other aspects of the pension that are extremely impor
tant. It says nothing about when one is eligible. It says
nothing about what happens to the benefit after retirement.
Is the $6,000 fixed, or does it grow with the cost of living?
And what happens to the benefit if one decides to forgo the
pension and work another year? Will the annual benefit in
crease, and if so, by how much?
A far superior summary statistic of the value of a pension
is the wealth or asset equivalent of that promise. In
economists' terms, it is the present discounted value of the
future income stream—the amount of money that would
have to be invested today to provide exactly the income
stream that is promised. Because investments pay interest,
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dollars promised farther and farther in the future are the
equivalent to smaller and smaller amounts today.
As an example, with an interest rate of 10 percent, an in
vestment of $60,000 would provide an annual income of
$6,000 forever. A gift of $60,000 and a gift of $6,000 per
year forever are exactly equivalent, given the 10 percent in
terest rate. By lending or borrowing, one could always turn
either one into the other.
If $6,000 annual income will not last forever (for example,
it terminates at death) then the asset equivalent is less than
$60,000. The precise amount can easily be calculated.
There are tremendous advantages to defining the value of
social security or pension promises in terms of their asset
equivalent. First, the age of eligibility is important. The far
ther away it is, the lower current asset value of a given an
nual benefit.
In addition, inflation protection is easily incorporated into
this calculation, via the discount rate that translates future
dollars into today's dollars. Indexed benefits are discounted
at the real rate of interest, whereas nominal benefits that do
not grow with the cost of living are discounted at the
nominal rate—the real rate plus the rate of inflation.
With the concept of present discounted value in mind, let
me ask the following question. The answer to this question is
key to my view of the financial incentives in our pension
plans. Suppose an individual is currently eligible for retire
ment benefits of $6,000 per year until death. What happens
to this annual benefit if the individual instead chooses to re
main on the job and work another year?
There is good news and bad news. The bad news, with
respect to the pension, is that the individual loses the $6,000.
One does not draw pension benefits while continuing on the
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job. The good news is that future annual benefits (employer
pension or social security) are likely to exceed $6,000 because
of that additional year of work.
Why are they higher? It is important to understand this.
With respect to social security, future benefits increase for
two reasons. First, annual benefits are based on a social
security concept called average monthly earnings. With an
additional year of work, average monthly earnings will rise,
as will the subsequent benefit calculation.
In addition, there is a second reason—an actuarial adjust
ment, which is basically a reward from the Social Security
Administration for claiming checks for one fewer year. Be
tween 62, the earliest age of social security eligibility, and 65,
the actuarial adjustment is about 7 percent per year of delay.
At 65, prior to 1983, it dropped to 1 percent. This adjust
ment applies to all future checks. Most people recognize it in
a slightly different form. Anyone contemplating retirement
realizes that retirement at 62, the earliest age, rather than
three years later, the normal age, entails a benefit reduction
of 20 percent. This 20 percent is approximately three times
the 7 percent annual figure that I have introduced.
Employer pensions are more complicated, because there
are thousands of them, and each has its own individual re
quirements, rules and regulations. But pension benefits are
usually based on either years of service or on average earn
ings over the last few years with the firm. Either of these is
likely to grow with an additional year of work. In addition,
some pension plans also have actuarial adjustments similar
to that I described for social security.
The pension implication of the choice to retire or to work
another year is not as simple as the choice between $6,000
and zero. It is a choice between two pension streams—one
that begins immediately and provides $6,000 per year, and

another that pays nothing in the first year, but higher annual
benefits (say, $6,500) in the future. Which one of these
streams is worth more? It depends—always a safe answer in
economics. It depends on whether the future $500 annual in
crements are sufficient to compensate for the $6,000 loss in
the first year.
It is difficult to decide by looking at the streams, since the
amounts arrive at different times. But as soon as they are
translated into present discounted value, the answer is
clear—the stream with the higher asset equivalent.
Suppose today's value of the first stream ($6,000, $6,000,
$6,000, etc.) is $45,000, and the second ($0, $6,500, $6,500,
etc.) is $50,000. Then working another year yields two
benefits—paychecks for that year, which is certainly good
news, and a $5,000 increase in the value of pension (or social
security) rights. The latter increases by $5,000 because of the
decision to work that year. As such, it is really a component
of compensation. If the straight salary was $20,000 for the
year, the true compensation was $25,000—$20,000 plus the
$5,000 increment in pension wealth.
Unfortunately, it can work both ways. Suppose the pres
ent discounted value of the second stream were $40,000
rather than $50,000. What would true compensation be
then? While the individual earns $20,000 in salary, the value
of the pension rights drops by $5,000. Th true compensation
is only $15,000 for the year of work.
An interesting question is which of these two scenarios is
more likely to describe the situation facing older workers to
day. Before presenting some actual data, let me just sum
marize the results and describe the bottom line. Social securi
ty and many pensions are structured so that at some
point—and certainly by 65—the second scenario holds. The
present discounted value of social security and employer
pension rights begin to decrease with continued work. One
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pocket is filled by paychecks, while the other is picked by
social security and pension rules. One's true compensation is
less than it looks. This is the surreptitious pay cut I alluded
to in the introduction.
When do these losses occur? They occur at different times
for different people. But a major change in the incentives
happens at age 65—precisely the age at which mandatory
retirement was most likely to go into effect back when the
Retirement History sample was being studied. This
simultaneity makes it difficult, through not impossible, to
discern exactly what was influencing individual behavior.
Was it mandatory retirement, "the stick," or these financial
incentives, "the carrot"—the pay cuts that often accompany
age 65?
Table 2 shows actual data for a sample of employed men
aged 63 to 65 in 1974. It illustrates what would have happen
ed to the present discounted values of pension (top) and
social security (bottom) rights if these workers had chosen to
work another year. For 63 year old men, for example, there
is relatively little change in the asset value of pensions.
Similar proportions have them increased and decreased (the
median is -$148), and most of the change is less than $1,000.
(The 43 percent "unchanged" are those not eligible for pen
sions.)
At age 64, however, there are significantly more losers
than gainers, and the size of the losses has increased. The
median person, ignoring those unchanged, would lose over
$1,100 in pension wealth. By age 65, nearly everyone loses
and the median loss exceeds $2,000.
The changes in social security wealth are much more
dramatic. Until 65, the median person gains—over $1,800 at
age 63 and $800 at 64. But at 65, beware. Everyone would
lose social security wealth with continued work. The median
loss for this particular sample of men was over $3,000.
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Table 2
Changes in Present Valueaof Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)

Employer pensions
Reduced by more than $5000
$3001 to $5000
$1001 to $3000
$1 to $1000
Unchanged
Increased by $1 to $1000
$1001 to $2000
Total
Medianb
Social Security
Reduced by $3001 to $6000
$1501 to $3000
$1 to $1500
Unchanged
Increased by $1 to $1500
$1501 to $3000
$3001 to $6000
Total
Medianb

Age of employed men
64
65
63
(percent) (percent) (percent)
1
2
6
4
8
2
27
7
26
11
19
20
47
46
43
4
1
22
0
0
3
100
100
100
-$1,156 -$2,062
-$148

0
0
12
6
29
51
3
100
$1,852

0
1
16
3
45
34
1
100
$857

48
43
3
6
1
0
0
100
-$3,044

SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration;
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
a. Present values calculated with a 5 percent discount rate.
b. Median calculation omits those with no change.
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Why the big change at 65? The reason is the legislated
decrease in the actuarial adjustment, from 7 percent per year
of delay between 62 and 64 to only 1 percent (in 1974) for
each year of postponement after 65. The social security
reward for continued work decreased dramatically, and
became insufficient to compensate for a year of foregone
benefits.
Whether these gains and losses are considered big depends
on the object of comparison. Table 3 compares them to the
individual's before-tax earnings. It calculates the wealth
changes as a percent of salary.
The top half of the table refers to people who do not have
pensions and are eligible for social security only. As was seen
in table 2, the median person gains social security wealth at
63 and at 64, but loses substantially at 65. The median loss in
this sample is estimated to equal about a third of an annual
salary.
Below are individuals eligible for both social security and
pensions. At the median, there is a modest net gain in total
retirement income wealth at 63, a small loss at 64, and a
dramatic loss at 65. The median 65 year old in this sample
would be working for approximately half pay because of the
penalties implicit in the social security and pension systems.
These estimates are very rough, and may exaggerate the
size of the pay cut. They ignore issues of taxation, and
assume that anybody who works full time loses all social
security benefits. In fact, with low enough earnings, one can
both work and collect social security benefits. The point of
the table is that the work disincentives can be large. And
keep in mind that there are distributions around these me
dian values. There are losers even at ages when the median
person gains.
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Table 3
Changes in Present Value of Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, as a Percentage of Annual Before Tax Earnings,
for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)

Eligible for social security only
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent

Age of employed men
63
64
65
(percent) (percent) (percent)
74
0
6
17
9
0
0
0
0

Gain of 0 to 10 percent
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent
30 percent or more
Total

23
24
23
11
100

4
18
22
32
10
8
100

Median change

+ 13

+ 10

100
-35

3
17

Eligible for social security and employer pension
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent

6
1
18

15
18
22

92
6
2

Gain of 0 to 10 percent
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent
30 percent or more

18
34
17
7

19
22
4
0
100
-38

0
0
0
0
100
-48

Total
Median changes

100
+ 12

SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration;
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
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Let me summarize what we have seen thus far. I am con
vinced that there are financial incentives to retire. At some
age—certainly by 65, but earlier for many people—the
values of social security and pension rights begin to decline if
one continues to work.
Second, these work disincentives can be large relative to
the paycheck. Third, these work disincentives grow
significantly in magnitude at age 65, precisely the age of
mandatory retirement prior to the 1977 legislation.
What I have not yet shown is that these incentives affect
people's behavior. For that to occur, people must under
stand them and respond to them. Richard Burkhauser and I
have analyzed the impact of these incentives, using samples
of older workers drawn from the Retirement History Study,
and find strong evidence that this is the case. Variables
describing the size of social security and pension wealth
changes associated with continued work are very significant
in explaining differences in individual retirement behavior.
The larger the wealth losses, the more likely people are to
withdraw from the labor force and retire. The people in the
sample certainly behave as though they understand and res
pond to financial incentives.
I can summarize about four years of research in a simple
analogy—much as I hate to admit it. Consider the following
contract. For any hour that you work before noon, you will
be paid $10 per hour; for any hour you work after noon, you
will be paid $6 per hour. How would you respond? Most
people would try to pack all the work hours in before noon
and head for the beach in the afternoon.
To oversimplify a bit, this is exactly what social security
and pension systems do, except that noon is age 65. After age
65, or earlier for some, true compensation decreases because
social security and pension rights become less and less
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valuable with continued work. This occurs because higher
benefits in the future do not adequately compensate for
benefits foregone today.
Burkhauser and I have also found that about half of the
difference in behavior we observed between people who did
and did not have mandatory retirement could be explained
by other factors, primarily the financial incentives I have
described. Mandatory retirement is nowhere near as impor
tant as it looks. We predict, therefore, that changing the law,
as we did in 1977, or eliminating mandatory retirement
altogether would have only a modest effect on aggregate
behavior.
Changing the mandatory retirement law was a good idea,
because people who really want to remain at their jobs can
do so—at least until age 70. But, I think it will have only
small impact on retirement patterns. Why? I return to the
title of this talk—"the Carrot and the Stick." Even if depriv
ed of the stick, mandatory retirement, employers still retain
the carrot, the incentives built into their pensions systems.
Mandatory retirement and actuarially unfair pension
systems are alternative means to the same end.
To change retirement behavior, it is essential to change the
incentives. To some extent we already have. The 1 percent
actuarial adjustment that social security applies after age 65
has already been increased in 1982 to 3 percent per year of
delay. Although this is still far from actuarially fair, it does
decrease the size of the work disincentives, and is a move in
the right direction.
The incentives will be changed even further by a rarely
publicized and little understood part of the legislation passed
in April of 1983. This legislation delayed the cost of living
adjustment for social security recipients for six months. It in
troduced the taxation of the social security benefits of high
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income recipients. It proposes delaying the age of full social
security eligibility from 65 to 67 by the year 2027. But most
important from our perspective, it increases the actuarial ad
justment from 3 to 8 percent over a twenty year period begin
ning in 1990. This may seem like a minor component of the
legislation, but I think it is an important one. It makes social
security wealth much less dependent on the age of retire
ment, and significantly decreases the size of the implicit pay
cuts accompanying old age.
As an economist, I believe that people respond to financial
incentives. My research confirms this. However, I will be the
first to admit, if you haven't beaten me to it, that people re
spond to many other things as well. I do not mean to imply
that this is the whole story of retirement—the whole answer
is the question of why people retire when they do. Attitudes
towards work are very important, as are health status, living
arrangements, and expectations about the future. But the in
centives that I have described tonight are also important.
And they are more easily changed by public policy, such as
legislation, than many of the other determinants.
Acknowledging the incentives that are hidden in our pension
and social security systems is essential to understanding what
has occurred in the past and influencing what will happen in
the future.
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Inflation and the Economic
Well-Being of Older Americans*
Robert Clark
and
Daniel A. Sumner
North Carolina State University

Introduction
It has long been believed that the elderly have fixed or con
stant incomes and thus are more adversely affected by infla
tion than other demographic groups. For example, at the
beginning of the 1970s, Arthur Okun (1970, p. 14) concluded
that the "... retired aged are the only major specific
demographic group of Americans that I can confidently
identify as income losers," in response to inflation. Il
lustrating the continuing prevalence of this view is the assess
ment of the 1981 White House Conference on Aging, which
stated in its final report (p. 27, 30) that "the elderly are par
ticularly vulnerable to loss from inflation" and that "reduc
ed inflation is especially beneficial to retired persons because
it allows them to be better able to take care of themselves."
These comments express a widely believed conclusion that
has influenced the development of public policy toward the
elderly. During the past few years, that belief has been
challenged in the public press and in scholarly papers. This
paper contributes to an understanding of the response of the
income of the elderly to rising prices, and documents the ex
perience of the 1970s.
*This paper, presented by Robert Clark, was based in part on research reported in more
detail in R.L. Clark, G.L. Maddox, R.A. Schrimper, and D.A. Sumner, Inflation and the
Economic Well-Being of the Elderly. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.)
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The hypothesis that the elderly are more vulnerable to in
flation is carefully examined in this paper and then rejected.
The mistake in the above argument is assuming that older
persons live on fixed incomes. In the recent past, the major
income sources of the elderly have been earnings, social
security payments, pensions, other federal transfer programs
and returns on accumulated assets. Wages and interest rates
that the elderly earn rise with expected inflation just as for
the rest of the population. Explicit indexation, ad hoc ad
justments, and in-kind benefit payments have maintained
the real value of federally administered transfers to the elder
ly. Employer pension benefits also tend to rise with inflation,
though these do not seem to have kept pace with price in
creases. Finally, informal transfers from family and con
sumption from accumulated durable assets are hard to
measure but make up a significant factor in the well-being of
the elderly. Since most of the sources of income for the elder
ly are not fixed but increase along with price increases, the
real questions are the changes in elderly income relative to
changes in the price of goods they purchase and relative to
the incomes of other groups and the diversity in consump
tion and income among older persons.
Our measures of economic well-being indicate that real in
come of older persons rose during much of the 1970s. This
rising real income for persons in the older age groups pro
duced an increase in real consumption for most of the elder
ly. By contrast, wage increases did not keep up with infla
tion, so the median weekly real earnings of most groups of
full-time wage and salary workers were approximately 10
percent lower in 1981 than in 1973. As a result the income of
the elderly as a percent of income of the total population
rose. Thus, during the past inflationary decade, the real and
relative economic status of the elderly improved. These con
clusions are based on comparing the experience of different
sets of elderly households over time. Changes in real incomes
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and expenditures for the same set of households in a cohort
were negative; but this is not the result of inflation, rather it
is a part of life-cycle patterns in income and spending.
A review of the experience of the 1970s will be helpful in
understanding the future only if general relationships can be
identified. Thus, in examining each source of income, we ex
amine past changes in response to inflation and the adjust
ment mechanism. In the final section, we reexamine these
general relationships in an attempt to assess the vulnerability
of the elderly to price changes in the 1980s.

Measuring Well-Being and Inflation
In order to examine the effect of inflation on well-being, a
measure of well-being must be adopted. We use the prin
ciples of a subjective utility function or satisfaction index as
our general measure of well-being. Individuals and families
are assumed to allocate their productive resources to earn in
come and to allocate their income and time among goods
and services to make themselves as well off as possible. For
detailed discussions of utility maximization see textbooks by
Layard and Walters (1978) or Henderson and Quandt
(1980). The concept of economic welfare is discussed and ap
plied in Moon and Smolensky (1977).
Changes in prices affect both sides of the incomeexpenditure relationship. For most families wage and in
terest rates are the most important prices on the income side,
but other prices also directly affect the incomes of farmers
and other self-employed persons. The amount of goods and
services people may consume with their limited resources
also depends on prices. Prices that matter most are, of
course, those of the goods with the largest budget shares.
These budget shares vary from household to household
because of differences in age, income and other factors.
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Most transactions in our economy use dollars to measure
the goods and services being traded. Absolute or money
prices are the rates of exchange between dollars and par
ticular goods and services. The general price level or the level
of the price index is an average level of the money prices in
the economy. This average, however, must be compared to
something to be meaningful. Typically, the general price
level is compared to past price levels or to prices in other
countries or regions. Inflation is the ratio of the sustained in
crease in the general level of prices compared to past levels.
It might be thought of as a shrinking of the measuring rod
we use to measure incomes and expenditures. To say that the
prices of goods and services in general have risen is to say
that the value of a unit of money has fallen. The magnitude
of this decline is indicated by an increase in the price index.
Several indicators are available for measuring the increase
in prices in the United States. Throughout this analysis we
use the consumer price index (CPI) as our indicator of price
changes. Wahl (1982) and Kahn (1982) recently have debated
the use of the consumer price index as a measure of inflation.
It is generally agreed that changes in the CPI have tended to
overstate the rate of inflation in the United States. Thus, an
upward trend in real income will be understated if nominal
income is deflated by the CPI, but for our purposes this
problem is not severe. For a discussion of the CPI and other
measures of price changes in the context of the elderly, see
Clark et al. (1981).
Information about price changes is valuable but costly, so
consumers and producers use resources to discover how
prices have changed. For example, a workers who received a
wage increase may not know if the wages of workers in other
firms or occupations have risen. She may then not know if a
change of employers would be in her interest without search
ing in the labor market. Especially with variable rates of in
flation, the cost of gathering price information and the costs
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of mistakes in allocation may be quite sizable. If all prices
rise in exact proportion, and if we all knew that this was hap
pening, inflation would have little effect because we would
design our institutions and transactions in a way so as to
nullify the influence of these price changes. But in any
economy, relative prices of goods and services are constantly
changing along with wages and other determinants of con
sumer incomes. In response, people change the quantities of
goods and services they buy and sell. They also change hours
of work, occupations, and other determinants of income.
With inflation added to normal movement of relative prices,
allocative mistakes are more common and this constitutes a
real cost of inflation in the economy (Dornbusch and Fischer
1981, Gordon 1981).
When people have the opportunity to substitute goods that
have become cheaper for goods that become more expensive,
they often can mitigate the negative effects of price changes.
In fact, if nominal prices and incomes change in a way that
leaves the original consumption bundle available, the con
sumer could always be better off after the price change. One
of the major shortcomings of the CPI as a measure of the
cost of living is that it does not allow for substitution in
response to changes in relative prices.
Major factors in understanding the effects of inflation are:
(a) the accuracy of anticipation of inflation, (b) confusion
between relative price changes and inflation, and (c) (as an
important corollary to the above) the speed and cost of in
stitutional adjustments to inflation. If high rates of inflation
were to persist, perceptions, expectations and institutions
would more fully reflect potential inflation and its effect
would be mitigated. This very important distinction between
anticipated inflation and actual inflation should be kept in
mind in any discussion of the effects of inflation and
especially in drawing conclusions from past inflations about
the potential effects of future inflations.
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Income and Expenditures of the Elderly
and Their Sensitivities to Inflation
The major sources of income of elderly households in the
United States are labor market earnings, social security,
employer pensions, government cash transfers, private cash
transfers, in-kind government transfers, asset income and
the use of consumer durables. Some of these income sources
are effectively fixed by past choices and circumstances,
whereas others are responsive to current decisions. Some
decisions are adjusted to changes in the economic environ
ment facing the family (such as changes in actual or an
ticipated rates of inflation) whereas fixed income sources re
spond to changes in the economic environment only through
institutional or other channels outside a person's direct con
trol.
The elderly might be distinguished from others by their
shares of income derived from each of the sources. For ex
ample, almost all persons over 65 receive some social security
payments, which are now indexed for inflation. But shares
of social security income vary widely among the elderly—for
some it is the major income source, for others only a minor
supplement. Another income source almost universal in
coverage is medicare benefits, which form a part of the inkind government transfers. The importance of medicare
depends on the total amount of income available and also on
the health of the elderly family. Since this transfer is an inkind benefit, it is also effectively protected from inflation.
Note that as is true for all in-kind transfers, the relative price
of the commodity is affected by the form of the transfer.
Income received in the form of specified quantities of con
sumed goods and services is particularly hard to evaluate.
Consider medical services, for example. A household that is
eligible for medicare has received a low- (perhaps zero-) pric-
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ed insurance plan. Part of the household's income is the
value of this insurance. Even if a market value for the in
surance could be established, however, some households
would not have purchased it at that price. Thus, the
household's income is overestimated in valuing medicare at
its market value.
These income sources do not depend directly on the cur
rent choices of the elderly, but others do depend on in
dividual choice. The choice to retire or to change hours of
work are potentially flexible, and the wage earned will be af
fected by inflation. The value of pension benefits and the
decision to accept pensions are also affected by current and
anticipated inflation.
Changes in wealth and income from changes in the prices
of assets and durable goods affect potential consumption
and well-being in each period, even if the asset is not sold
and the capital gain is not realized. Take housing services,
for example. For a family owning the house in which it
resides, part of its total income is the service flow in each
period from the house. The family housing expenditure in
cludes use of the house (rather than renting or selling it). An
unanticipated increase in the price of houses increases
wealth, but on the expenditure side it also increases the value
of the service flow of housing received and hence the "ex
penditure" on housing.
These examples illustrate that inflation may affect the
elderly differently from other families and that this effect
will not be homogeneous among different segments of the
elderly population. The amounts and shares of income
received from each source and the decisions about work and
other investments determine these differential impacts.
Consumption patterns of the elderly may also differ from
the rest of the population. Consumption may be decompos-
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ed as current purchases of goods and services, service flows
from durables, private in-kind transfers, government in-kind
transfers, net savings, and taxes and government services.
The issue of taxes is usually dealt with either by using net
after-tax income or by letting taxes be an expenditure
category. If income tax payments are thought of as a pay
ment for services, then gross income is the measure of in
come and taxes are one of the expenditure categories.
Given stocks of assets and income, the consumer makes a
consumption-savings decision (that is, how much to add or
subtract from net wealth) and a portfolio decision (that is,
how to allocate savings or dissavings between assets and con
sumer durables). The saving decision of the household
depends on the expected inflation-adjusted interest rate and
other factors like expected length of life. The consumer also
decides the allocation of current consumption among the
potential goods and services. Allocation of consumption
depends on the total income to be allocated, prices, and the
other constraints that may be placed on the household. An
example of these other constraints is the amount and form of
in-kind income. Inflation may affect the consumption bun
dle by affecting relative prices, real current income, or other
constraints that apply to the household.
Putting the income and expenditure together allows an ac
counting of the effect of inflation on potential consumption.
In application to elderly Americans, specific facts about in
stitutions, behavior patterns, and relative price changes are
considered. This framework does not formally incorporate
the increase in costs of mistakes in allocation of resource that
follow necessarily from anticipated price changes. Nor does
it incorporate the cost of additional resources spent to ac
quire the process information about price changes.
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Measuring the Real Income of the Elderly
with the Retirement History Study
This section reports changes in income of older persons us
ing populations from the Retirement History Study (RHS).
We show the pattern of income as these groups lived through
the inflationary period of the early 1970s. Examining the in
come of a group of older persons as they age will show the
influences of lifecycle decisions along with changing
economic conditions.
The RHS is a series of surveys conducted for the Social
Security Administration using respondents aged 58-63 in
1969. Married men, nonmarried men, and nonmarried
women were interviewed every two years. For this analysis,
we use data from the 1969, 1971, 1973 and 1975 surveys. A
comprehensive list of income, work and health questions was
asked of over 11,000 respondents. The RHS has become the
most widely used data for examining the income and work
patterns of older persons (Irelan 1972). In each interview,
respondents were asked detailed questions concerning their
cash income in the preceding year. We focus on average
nominal and real income for married couples.
This cohort analysis reveals significant declines in income
with aging as earnings decline in response to reduced labor
supply. This expected lifecycle pattern of income must not be
confused with an inflation effect. The limited evidence sug
gests that the real income of older persons remained fairly
stable during the years before retirement and through the
retirement period.

Real Income Patterns
The sources of income in the RHS used to determine fami
ly income are earnings, social security, employer pensions,
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other governmental cash transfers, and asset income. The
RHS survey does not include enough information to assess
carefully the movements in other income sources. Earnings
are shown separately for husband and wife and represent
both wage and self-employment earnings. The other transfer
income includes income from disability and welfare pro
grams. Asset income is composed of income from rent, stock
and bonds, and savings accounts.
The sample population of families consists of all husband
and wife couples that remained together throughout the
survey period; i.e., only those couples interviewed in every
survey year are included in the base sample. The mean for
each income source is calculated from the set of respondents
with useable answers to the question concerning the specific
income source in question including zero values.
Table 1 shows the income history of husband-wife couples
as the ages of the husbands rise from 57 to 62 in 1968 to 63 to
68 years old by 1974. The mean nominal income of $9,773 in
1968 falls slightly over the six-year period to $9,129 in 1974.
During this period, the consumer price index (CPI) rose
from 104.2 to 147.7. As a result, the real income in 1967
dollars of this sample declined sharply from $9,380 to
$6,181, a fall of 34 percent. The decline in real income occurs
in response to inflation and changes in other economic con
ditions that alter the real returns to assets and labor supply.
But the income pattern mostly reflects individual lifecycle
decisions, especially declining hours of work in old age.
The changing composition of income is of particular interst to this study. In 1968, earnings represented 88.2 percent
of family income; however, by 1974, nominal earnings of the
husband had dropped by almost half, and family earnings
accounted for only 45.0 percent of total income. This decline
is primarily the result of fewer hours worked per workers
and fewer workers. These are expected lifecycle patterns. But
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the earnings decline is also influenced by changing real wages
and family income, which may be altered by inflation.
Though earnings are less important to the elderly, even when
the husbands are aged 64 to 69, they comprise half of the
average family income.
Table 1
Mean Income for Couples in Retirement History Survey
1968-74
Source

1968

1970

1972

1974

Earnings
Husband ..............
Wife .................
Social security income. ....
Pension income ..........
Other government transfers
Asset income ............

$7,066
1,550
190
340
63
565

$6,545
1,546
320
551
220
738

$5,247
1,396
967
1,026
291
937

$2,938
1,172
2,102
1,709
262
1 039

9 771

9,863
7,728

9 129
6,181

3,376

3 725

Total nominal income .....
Total real income3 ........

9,380

9,762
8,394

Sample size ..............

3,361

3,416

SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
a. Values in 1967 dollars as measured by the consumer price index.

Employer pension and social security benefits account for
an increasing proportion of average family income as the
household ages. Pensions represented 3.5 percent and social
security 1.9 percent of family income in 1968, but they in
crease in importance to 18.7 and 23.0 percent, respectively,
in 1974. Growth in the mean pension and social security in
come is primarily attributable to the increased proportion of
persons receiving these payments. Inflation may alter pen
sion income by influencing labor supply choices and by
reducing the real value of a given nominal pension. Other
monetary government transfers represent less than 3.0 per-

cent of income in all years. The effect of inflation on this
form of income depends on the government response to
higher prices in the form of increased benefits.
The significant rise in mean asset income between 1968
and 1972, while the average age of the sample increases for
60 to 64 years, is consistent with a growth in personal wealth
in the years immediately prior to retirement. Hurd and
Shoven (1982b) found that the real value of stocks and bonds
for RHS couples fell, but the real value of bank accounts
rose. Real income from current assets depends on the rate of
return compared with the change in prices. The elderly ex
perience inflation effects different from others only if the
makeup of their investment portfolios differs.
Table 1 suggests that the fall in real income is due primari
ly to the change in labor market income. This finding is sup
ported by the data in Table 2, which shows real income is
fairly stable during the final work years, declines at retire
ment, and then remains constant during the retirement years.
Disaggregating this sample by age of husband, race and
residence reveals a similar pattern of decline in real income
with age. This decline and changing composition of income
is also observed for nonmarried men and women. This con
clusion is further supported by an examination of older
cohorts in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics and of
respondents in the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey
(see Clark et al., 1984). These findings concerning trends in
the real income of older persons as they age are also in
general agreement with related findings of Hurd and Shoven
(1982a), Barnes and Zedlewski (1981) and Bridges and
Packard (1981). For a better understanding of the response
of real income to inflation, specific income sources are ex
amined in more detail. This analysis clearly indicates that
most sources of income of the elderly rise with increases in
consumer prices.
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Table 2
Real Income for Families in the Retirement History Study
by Year of Husband's Retirement

Retire between 1969-71 ....
Retire between 1971-73 ....
Retire between 1973-75 ....
In labor force 1969-75.....

1968

Real income3
1972
1970

1974

10,036
9,953
9,972
9,980

7,281
9,994
9,602
9,711

5,154
5,327
7,051
9,003

5,229
7,712
9,754
9,718

SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
a. Values in 1967 dollars are measured by the consumer price index.

Earnings
Individuals develop lifecycle plans for time and resource
allocation that generate anticipated age-earnings patterns.
As persons age, they tend to reduce their labor supply either
by entirely leaving the labor force or by working fewer
hours. The declines in mean cohort earnings reported earlier
are not unexpected and should not be considered mainly a
response to inflation. However, unanticipated events such as
unexpectedly high rates of inflation may cause persons to
change their lifetime plans of work and retirement. These
changes would occur in response to changes in the real wage
rate and to shifts in the real value of wealth.
As long as real wages and real wealth are unchanged in
response to inflation, older persons would likely not modify
their work and retirement plans during periods of rising
prices. The important issues are how inflation alters the real
compensation package and wealth that a person expects.
Clearly, the wage may change in late life even without price
changes. The wage could be changing in response to
economy-wide productivity gains, other macroeconomic
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conditions, individuals augmenting their skills, or persons
suffering declines in their talents, perhaps because of health
declines. Lifecycle models usually predict declining real
wages during the final work years (Ghez and Decker 1975).
Various institutional arrangements such as labor contracts
and equal opportunity laws may limit wage adjustments by
hampering reductions in nominal wage rates while allowing
real wage reductions. Inflation may permit some firms to
lower real wages and encourage earlier retirement. Even if
the cash wage rises at the same rate as prices, the total com
pensation may fall because of the effect of inflation on the
real value of fringe benefits. For example, the real value of
initial pension benefits decline with rising prices if the benefit
is determined using a salary averaging period (Clark and
McDermed 1982).
Table 3 shows that the labor force participation rate for
husbands fell from 79.4 to 25.2 percent between 1968-1974.
For men in the labor force, average hours of work declined
from 42.6 to 34.4 hours per week. Smaller declines occurred
for wives in both of these measures of labor supply. These
reductions in labor supply reflect declines in work with age
and responses to inflation and other economic events.
Table 3
Labor Supply of Couples
Husbands
Hours per
Labor force
week
participation
1969

79.4

1971
1973

65.1
40.5

1975

25.2

Wives
Labor force
participation

Hours per
week

42.6
41.3

33.1
31.7

39.4

25.5

35.8
34.9

34.4

20.1

32.9

SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.

35.9
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During this period, average earnings for men declined by
more than 57 percent, reflecting reduced market work. Earn
ings of wives fell by 23 percent. These declines in nominal
earnings occurred despite rising nominal wages. The average
nominal wage of working men rose by one-third from $3.71
in 1969 to $4.93 in 1975 and the mean nominal wage of
working wives rose by 60 percent. However, the real wage of
men fell by almost 10 percent and average real earnings
dropped 70 percent. By contrast, the real wage of the wives,
who are usually slightly younger than their husbands, rose by
10 percent, but their real earnings fell because of reduced
labor supply.
Social Security
Throughout the first three decades of the existence of the
social security system, benefits were increased periodically
by specific congressional action. The 1972 amendments pro
vided for automatic indexing of benefits starting in 1975.
Past earnings records were indexed to provide for rising real
initial benefits. Both the indexing and the ad hoc changes
have actually increased the real value of social security
benefits for many retirees. For example, the benefits of a
person retired in 1967 would have risen by 171 percent be
tween 1968 and 1979. Since the CPI rose by 117.7 percent,
real social security benefits have increased by approximately
25 percent. Most of these real increases occurred between
1968 and 1972, prior to the automatic adjustment of
benefits. Since that time, benefits have risen in step with in
creases in the CPI, and the real value of benefits has by and
large remained constant. Nominal increases in benefits after
retirement between 1968 and 1982 are shown in Table 4.
An examination of increases in social security benefits in
the RHS sample indicates that real social security income
was largely insulated from erosion by price increases. The ad

Table 4
Social Security Benefits in January of Each Year3 as a Percent of Initial Benefits
Year

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

100

113
100

130
115
100

143
127
110
100

143
127
110
100
100

172
152
132
120
120
100

172
152
132
120
120
100
100

190
168
147
133
133
111
111
100

106
182
158
144
144
120
120
108
100

219
194
168
153
153
128
128
115
106.4
100

212
205
178
162
162
135
135
122
113
105.9
100

247
218
190
173
173
144
144
130
120
113
106.5
100

271
240
209
190
190
158
158
142
132
124
117
109.0
100

310
274
239
217
217
181
181
162
151
142
134
126
114.3
100

345
305
266
241
241
201
201
180
168
158
149
140
127
111.2
100

SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, 1977-79, p. 26 and recent issues of Social Security Bulletin.
a. The values along a row indicate the Social Security benefit in each year as a percent of benefits in the year a person retired. For example, find
the year of retirement on the left-hand column, say 1971. In 1974, the benefit for a person who retired in 1971 is 120 percent of the initial benefit
received in 1971. These percentages represent the minimum percentage increase in primary insurance amounts.
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hoc increases in post-retirement benefits were sufficient to
stabilize or increase real benefits during this decade. Initial
benefits were rising more rapidly than the rate of inflation.
These findings have important implications for the impact of
inflation on the well-being of the elderly. First, this impor
tant component of income of older persons has not declined
with price increases. Since over 90 percent of persons 65 and
over receive social security benefits, this is a significant
observation. Second, low income persons rely more heavily
on social security benefits since they tend not to have other
forms of cash income. For example, the 1970 Survey of New
ly Entitled Beneficiaries indicated that for the lowest income
groups social security benefits accounted for over 80 percent
of total cash income, but for high income groups, social
security is less than 20 percent of income.
Initial benefits at retirement also have risen rapidly. Table
5 illustrates the rise in initial benefits when average monthly
earnings are held constant over time. Rising lifetime earnings
of successive cohorts of retirees have produced additional
gains in initial benefits because of higher average monthly
earnings.

Pension Benefits
The real value of pension benefits during retirement is
determined by the rate of inflation and the extent of any
post-retirement benefit increases. One method of illustrating
the effect of inflation on the real value of pension benefits is
to calculate the expected wealth value of a constant benefit
over a person's life. In this formulation, the value of the pen
sion annuity is discounted by an interest rate and the prob
ability of remaining alive to receive the benefit. For a
60-year-old male retiree, a 7 percent annual rate of inflation
lowers the discounted value of his pension wealth by 58 per
cent (Clark and McDermed 1982).
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Table 5
Benefits for Persons Starting Payment at Age 65
in Various Years When Average Monthly Earnings
are $250, $500, $750, $1,000

AME
Year

$250

$500

$750

$1,000

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975b
1976b
1977b
1978b
1979b

114.51
131.68
144.85
144.85
173.82
192.93
208.37
221.69
234.77
250.03
274.78

117.51
209.13
224.56
224.56
269.46
299.10
323.03
343.66
363.94
387.60
425.60

218.00a
250.70a
295. 40a
295 .40a
354.97
394.01
425.53
452.73
479.454
510.62
561.18

218.00a
250.703
295. 40a
295 .40a
404.50a
449.54
485.48
516.50
547.00
582.57
640.25

SOURCE: Derived from information in Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Sup
plement, 1977-79, pp. 15-19.
a. Reached or exceeded the maximum level of PIA.
b. Law was effective in June of the given year.

This illustration assumes that pension benefits are not in
creased after a person retires and begins receiving benefits.
Many pension plans, however, are increased in response to
inflation, so benefits rise when the CPI increases. For exam
ple, the Federal Civil Service Retirement system has been ful
ly indexed since 1962 and many private plans provide ad hoc
increases (King 1982). Alien, Clark and Sumner (1984)
report that the average pension benefit for persons who
retired before 1973 rose by 24 percent between 1973 and
1979. This represented 40 percent of the CPI rise during the
period. These increases were widespread, as 75 percent of all
beneficiaries received at least one increase.
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Table 6 shows the mean real pension benefit of married
men in the RHS between 1968 and 1974. The sample is divid
ed by the survey year in which these men first are shown to
be receiving benefits. For persons who were receiving
benefits in 1968, the mean real 1974 benefit was only 3 per
cent lower. Somewhat larger declines are observed for the
groups that began to receive benefits in 1970 and 1972.
Table 6
Real Pension Benefits of Married Men in RHS, 1968-74
Real pension benefit3
Year of
first benefit
1968
1970
1972
1974

1968

1970

1972

1974

2,619b

2,325
2,159

2,341
2,107
2,220

2,547
2,071
1,956
1,942

SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews,
a. Benefits are in 1967 dollars as measured by the consumer price index,
b. The 1969 survey did not identify the proportion of family pension income in 1968 at
tributable to the husband and wife. The 1968 figure represents our estimate based on ex
amination of information in subsequent surveys and 1969 data on family members receiv
ing pension benefits.

These declines seem surprisingly small, especially for those
who have been retired the longest. This is due to the use of
the mean as a summary statistic and the fact that some peo
ple report large increases in pension benefits from one survey
to the next. The pension income of these men may rise
because firms have raised their benefits or because they begin
to receive a second pension. The addition of a second benefit
may substantially boost pension income and have a signifi
cant effect on the sample mean. This possibility is shown in
Table 7 by the fact that over 20 percent of the men have a 25
percent or larger gain in real benefits between the year of in-
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itial benefits and 1974. Table 7 also shows that when the
sample is divided at the mean of initial benefits, fewer per
sons with initial benefits below the mean had a decline in the
real value of their benefits. Further evidence that much of
the gain in real pension income is due to the starting of a sec
ond pension is the finding that almost 90 percent of persons
with gains of 25 percent or more are persons who had pen
sion income below the mean when they first started receiving
benefits. Thus, it seems likely that these men began pensions
from previous jobs as soon as they were eligible for benefits.
These relatively low benefits were eventually supplemented
by retirement income from more recent employment.
Table 7
Percent of Beneficiaries with Change in Pension Income
Between Initial Year of Benefits and 1974

Any increase in
nominal benefits .........
Loss in real benefits ........
Gain in real benefits ........
Above mean benefit
Loss in real benefits ......
Gain in real benefits ......
Below mean benefit
Loss in real benefits ......
Gain in real benefits ......

1968
retirees

1970
retirees

1972
retirees

49.1
70.0
30.0

52.9
64.7
35.3

53.2
69.0
31.0

79.3
20.7

78.3
21.7

81.4
18.6

64.9
35 1

57.7
42.3

62.1
37.9

SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.

These results are generally consistent with the findings of
Thompson (1978) that the median pension benefit for com
pletely retired pensioners in the RHS aged 63-64 rose from
$1,980 in 1970 to $2,160 in 1974. This represents a fall in the
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real value of the benefits, since the CPI increased by 14 per
cent and the nominal benefits rose by only 9 percent. The use
of completely retired persons probably eliminates many per
sons who acquired a second pension but continued employ
ment. This restricting of the sample population reduces the
variability of pension income over the period and reduces
much of the gains in pension income.

Evidence on Real Incomes of Persons 65 and Older
In contrast to the cohort analysis that follows a specific
group of individuals over time, this section uses aggregate
data to indicate the rising real income of all persons 65 and
older in each year. This analysis starts with a review of the
trend in cash income and then extends the discussion to in
clude the use of time and the value of in-kind benefits.
The median cash income, deflated by the CPI, of families
whose head is aged 65 or older rose by almost 100 percent
between 1950 and 1980. This rising real income of the elderly
is own in Table 8. Compared to that of all families, the
relative income of older families declined by 10 percent in the
1950s, remained fairly stable during the 1960s and rose by 20
percent during the 1970s. Because the median income of all
families can be substantially affected by the age-composition
of the population, the real income of older families is com
pared in Table 8 with that of families whose head is age
45-54. Heads of these families are in their peak earnings
years, thus the ratio of the income of elderly families to that
of families with heads aged 45-54 will be lower than when
compared to the relative income of all families. Compared to
the income of these middle-aged families, the relative income
of older families fell by 13.4 percent during the 1950s and by
6.7 percent in the 1960s before rising by 13.4 percent during
the 1970s (see Table 9). During these decades, the consumer
price index rose by 23.3 percent, 31.1 percent, and 112.4 per-
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cent, respectively. Thus, the loss in relative income was
greatest when inflation was the lowest and there was a
significant gain in relative income during the high-inflation
decade of the 1970s. It could be argued that the rise in
relative income of the elderly occurred because of the virtual
cessation of real economic growth during the 1970s which
stopped the growth in the real income of workers. By con
trast, the real income of the elderly continued to rise with in
creases in the real value of government transfers.

1950
1955
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Table 8
Real Median Family Income
Head of family
Head of family
65 and over
aged 45-54
(1)
(2)
$2,639
$ 5,110
2,900
6,344
3,266
7,303
3,377
7,491
3,536
7,770
3,655
8,086
3,634
8,344
3,661
8,717
3,750
9,116
3,927
9,676
4,348
10,012
4,374
10,561
4,345
10,422
4,495
10,706
4,763
11,218
4,827
11,437
5,081
11,210
4,998
10,899
5,115
11,165
5,019
11,478
5,193
11,580
5,202
11,661
5,215
11,035

Relative income
of elderly families
Kl-2)xlOO]
51.6
45.7
44.7
45.1
45.5
45.2
43.6
42.0
41.1
40.6
43.4
41.4
41.7
42.0
42.5
42.2
45.3
45.9
45.8
43.7
44.8
44.6
47.3

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, various years,
a. Values derived by deflating nominal income by CPI, 1967= 100.
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Table 9
Change in Real and Relative Income
Percent increase in real
cash median income

1950-60

Percent change
in relative
Percent change
income of
in consumer
elderly3
price index

Family head
aged 65 & over

Family head
aged 45-54

23.8

42.9

-13.4

31.1
112.4

1960-70

33.0

42.7

-6.7

1970-80

20.0

5.9

13.4

23.3

SOURCE: Table 8.
a. Percent change in last column of Table 8.

A further indication of the improving relative income of
the elderly is the decline in the incidence of poverty among
older Americans. Table 10 shows this decline along with the
change in the poverty rate for the total population. The
decline of poverty among the elderly has been much greater
than among other groups, and in 1982 for the first time the
poverty rate of the elderly was less than that for the popula
tion at large.
The subsection on earnings showed that households also
vary the way in which they allocate their time in order to in
fluence their level of living. Instead of market work, time
can be used to produce services consumed by the family.
These services may be in the form of meal preparation, home
repairs, leisure time, etc. Time at home is an important
aspect of family well-being. The trends in cash income
presented above do not include changes in time at home that
would affect family well-being.
Age-specific labor force participation rates are one
measure of the intensity of market work by a population
group and hence are an indirect measure of time available
for home activities. Table 11 shows that the participation
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rate for males aged 65 and over fell by over 50 percent be
tween 1950 and 1980. Participation rates for older women
have fallen slightly during this period. Thus, the rise in real
income reported in Table 8 understates the increase in
welfare because of significant increases in home time by the
elderly. By contrast, the total work effort of persons 45-54
increased during these three decades and the gains in income
for them overstates the rise in their well-being.
Table 10
Poverty Rates of the Elderly and Total Population

1959
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Elderly
Poverty
Number of
rate
persons

Total population
Poverty
Number of
rate
persons

(in millions)
5.5
4.6
4.8
4.7
4.3
3.7
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.7
3.9
3.9
3.8

(in millions)
39.5
25.4
24.1
25.4
25.6
24.5
23.0
24.3
25.9
25.0
24.7
24.5
25.3
29.3
31.8
34.4

32.2
25.0
25.3
24.5
21.6
18.6
16.3
15.7
15.3
15.0
14.1
14.0
15.2
15.7
15.3
14.6

22.4
12.8
12.1
12.6
12.5
11.9
11.1
11.6
12.3
11.8
11.6
11.4
11.6
13.0
14.0
15.0

SOURCES: U.S. bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 127,
"Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1980"
(Advance Data from the March 1981 Current Population Survey), GPO, Washington,
1981, p. 29 and U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 140,
"Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1982,"
GPO, Washington, 1983, p. 4.
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Table 11
Labor Force Participation Rates
65 and over
Females
Males
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1979
1980

45.8
39.6
33.1
27.9
26.8
21.7
20.0
19.1

9.7
10.6
10.8
10.0
9.7
8.3
8.3
8.1

45-54
Males

Females

95.8
96.5
95.7
95.6
94.2
92.1
91.4
91.2

37.9
43.8
49.8
50.9
54.4
54.6
58.4
59.9

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, various
years.

Cash income also ignores the value of in-kind transfers
received by older persons. Besides family and other private
transfers, the federal government provides in-kind benefits
in the form of health insurance and payment for medical ser
vices, food stamps and other nutritional programs, housing
assistance, and energy assistance. Most of these programs
have been initiated and expanded during the last two
decades. For example, medicare and medicaid were
established by legislation in 1965 and Table 12 shows the
significant increase in the real value of these benefits per
older person during the 1970s. The combined real value of
medicare and medicaid for the average older person rose
from $324.25 in 1970 to $580.98 in 1981, or an increase of 79
percent. Thus, the inclusion of medical in-kind benefits with
cash income would result in an even greater rise in the real in
come of the elderly during the 1970s than that indicated in
Table 8. Other in-kind transfers have also increased in real
value. For example, the real value of the subsidy for food
stamps rose from $95.16 per older recipient in 1970 to
$144.55 per older recipient in 1981.
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Table 12
Real In-Kind Transfers of Medical Services
Per Persons Aged 65 and Over
Medicare3
Supplemental
Health
health insurance
insurance
1970
1975
1978
1981

215.07
278.70
309.42
370.54

47.26
69.72
92.38
126.54

Federal Medicaidb

61.92
76.72
90.95
83.90

a. Values deflated by the medical component of the consumer price index, 1967= 100.
b. Estimates for total medicaid expenditures for persons aged 65 and over are divided by
population aged 65 and over. Expenditure estimates are from unpublished data from
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1978); Cahfano (1978) and U.S. Congres
sional Budget Office, 1982. Nominal values are deflated by the medical component of the
consumer price index.

The Growth of Federal Transfer Programs
to the Elderly
This section provides documentation of the role of federal
transfers in the income of the elderly. During the past half
century, the federal government has played an increasing
role in the determination of the economic well-being of the
elderly. The growth and development of cash and in-kind
benefit programs has significantly altered the sources of in
come for most older persons. Federal expenditures on the
elderly include payments through retirement programs, old
age survivors disability insurance (OASDI), health-care sub
sidies, welfare programs, housing assistance and social ser
vices. Table 13 lists the specific programs and the costs of
transfers from these programs in fiscal 1982 (U.S. Congres
sional Budget Office 1982; also see Califano 1978).
These federal expenditures have risen dramatically since
the early 1960s because of legislative changes and growth in
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the older population. The number of people aged 65 and
over has increased by 57.5 percent, from 16.7 million in 1960
to 26.3 million in July 1981. Benefit programs to the elderly
were $12.8 billion in 1960, whereas expenditures in 1982
reached $196.2 billion, a fifteenfold increase. These figures
do not include the value of preferential tax treatment given
to the elderly.
Table 13
Estimated Federal Outlays for Persons 65 and Older
by Program, Fiscal Year 1982
(in billions of dollars)

Program

Outlays

Social Security...................................
Medicare........................................
Other federal retirement and survivor programs .......
Medicaid........................................
Veterans' benefits ................................
Housing Assistance...............................
Supplemental Security Income .....................
Other federal health programs......................
Administration on Aging ..........................
Food stamps.....................................
Title XX Social Services ...........................
Energy Assistance ................................
Other...........................................

111.8
39.7
21.1
6.5
4.3
3.3
2.9
2.3
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.2
2.4

Total.........................................

196.2

SOURCE: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Work and Retirement: Options for Con
tinued Employment of Older Workers, Washington: GPO, July 1982, p. 55.

Between 1960 and 1982, the CPI more than tripled. As a
result, expenditures measured in 1967 dollars were $14.4
billion in 1960, and real spending on these programs in 1982
was five times the 1960 level. Thus, although two-thirds of
the growth rate in annual spending on the elderly is due to
price increases, there still has been a significant increase in
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the real resources allocated to these programs. The propor
tion of the federal budget used to finance these programs
rose from 13 percent in 1960 to 26.6 percent in 1982; the pro
portion of the gross national product allocated to these
benefit programs rose from 2.5 to 5.9 percent (Califano
1978; Torrey 1982).
Another way to measure this growth is to note that the
average benefit per person aged 65 and older increased from
$768 in 1960 to $7,948 in 1982. If benefits had been increased
only to reflect price increases, the average benefit would
have been $2,516 in 1982; if benefits had risen in accordance
with the growth in per capita disposable income, on the other
hand, the transfer per elderly person would have been $3,663
in 1982. This increase is the result of the introduction of new
programs, higher benefits under existing programs and less
restrictive eligibility conditions. Thus, much of the
"graying" of the federal budget has occurred because of ex
plicit policy changes by the federal government (Clark and
Menefee 1981). One important change in federal policy has
been the indexing of government programs to changes in
consumer prices. Presently, 86 federal programs now have
one or more provisions that increase in response to a rise in
some index, usually a measure of prices or wages (U.S. Con
gressional Research Service 1981). Indexing reduces the lag
and uncertainty of increases caused by ad hoc adjustments.

The Relative Impact
Imperfectly Anticipated Inflation
In addition to changes in real income, there are general ef
fects of inflation on well-being that arise from its unpredict
ability. Correctly anticipated inflation not entailing relative
price changes causes people to hold less cash and make more
frequent transactions, but these are relatively minor costs
(Dornbusch and Fischer 1981; Gordon 1981). However, the
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rate of inflation is seldom fully anticipated and higher rates
of inflation tend to be accompanied by more relative price
variability and by more variability in the rate of inflation
(Vining and Elwertowski 1976; Bordo 198]; Parks 1978;
Cukierman 1979; Logue and Willett 1976). When incorrectly
anticipated, an inflation factor is not built into market trans
actions and institutions of an economy. This causes the basic
losses in well-being and sense of unfairness that make infla
tion so unpopular.
The elderly share in losses to the whole economy from not
fully anticipated inflation, but they are not likely to suffer
more, on average, than other groups. Two factors are in
volved in their relative losses. First, any group that tends to
be more mistaken in its inflation expectations would lose
more. Given that the elderly have had more experience with
economic and political change and have more time away
from work to devote to market transactions, they may well
do a better job of correctly anticipating inflation rates. Sec
ond, any group that has higher costs of adjusting investment
and consumption patterns to changes in relative prices im
plied by inflation would lose more. The elderly are more like
ly to be retired and thus potentially more mobile; they have
more time away from jobs to be used for leisure and con
sumption, so they may be more flexible in their buying and
investment decisions. Thus, there is no presumption that the
elderly suffer more or less from the welfare losses due to
mistakes and adjustment costs than do others as the
economy faces inflation.

Summary and Implications
Earlier sections of this paper have been devoted to examin
ing the historical record of improving real income of the
elderly, this analysis will be useful for current policymaking
only if general and continuing relationships exist. The objec-
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tive of this final section is to assess the findings of this
research for projecting the future status of the elderly.
The elderly tend to spend larger proportions of their in
comes on food at home, medical care, and utilities than do
younger families. Reasons for these differences include
lower income for older families, more time at home, and
declining health with age. These different spending patterns
imply different sensitivities to relative price changes.
There is no theoretical reason to expect relative price
changes of the 1970s to continue into the future. For exam
ple, house prices rose rapidly during the 1970s but rose at a
slower rate during the early 1980s. Also, food prices have
risen more than the CPI in some years and less in others. The
importance of relative price changes in determining changes
in well-being should not be overlooked, but existing research
on age-specific price indices suggests that price increases af
fecting particular demographic groups do not deviate
substantially from the increase for the general population.
Recognizing substitution in consumption further moderates
the effects of differences in relative price changes on the in
crease in the price of the market basket actually purchased
by different groups.
These basic concepts and review of recent price changes in
dicate that relative price changes within a general inflation
will have only minor effects on the well-being of the elderly
compared to those for other demographic groups. Thus, the
primary issue governing the effect of inflation on real in
come of the elderly is the responsiveness of their incomes to
rises in the general price level and costs imposed by im
perfectly anticipated price changes.
Earnings are determined by the amount of labor supplied
and the market wage rate. Although labor supply falls with
age, earnings remain an important source of income for
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many older persons. Real wages rise with growth in produc
tivity. There is no theoretical reason why growth in the real
wage rate for older workers would deviate from this general
pattern of wage growth in the economy. This source of in
come should not cause changes in relative income between
the elderly and the total population, and, in general, real
wage growth will contribute to rising real income.
Social security retirement benefits and other governmental
transfers have increased rapidly in real value during the past
two decades. Since government transfers are now a major
source of income for older persons, their responsiveness to
price increases is an important determinant in the effect of
inflation on real income. If the recent legislative patterns
were to continue along with the existing indexation of pro
grams, the trend in real income of the elderly established
during the last two decades could be expected to continue.
However, many demographic, economic and political fac
tors are changing in ways that will limit the growth of
transfer payments to the elderly.
Social security legislation passed in 1983 represented the
culmination of years of debate concerning the long- and
short-run financial crises the system was facing. This legisla
tion provided for significant changes in the system and pro
vided for a projected funding balance over the next 75 years.
While the basic tenants of the program were left unchanged,
the 1983 cost-of-living increase was delayed six months and
full indexing in the future was made conditional on the
relative size of wage and price increases. These changes
slightly reduce the inflation protection guaranteed through
this major source of income to the elderly.
The aging of the population, especially in the first 20 years
of the next century, will require a major restructuring of the
total income maintenance system for the elderly. Either taxes
must be raised substantially, benefits must be lowered or
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funds diverted from other national priorities. The 1983
social security legislation attempted to address this long-run
problem by raising the age of eligibility for full benefits to 67
in the next century. In addition, medicare must be
reevaluated to prevent rapidly rising costs from producing
large deficits; in the coming decades other transfers likely
will be affected by this demographic pressure which may
limit their future growth.
The increase in real benefits for older persons was
stimulated in large measure by the belief that many older
persons were destitute and private methods would not pro
vide the necessary transfers. The rise in real and relative in
come of the elderly, along with a sharp decline in the in
cidence of poverty, has reduced or eliminated some of the
pressures for major new programs or increases in real
benefits for the elderly in general. Recent budgetary in
itiatives have reduced benefits and tightened eligibility condi
tions for medicaid, food stamps, and other welfare programs
that provide benefits to some older persons. Social security
and medicare benefits have also been altered during the early
1980s.
The trend toward indexation of these benefit programs is
attributable to the still commonly held view that the elderly
live on fixed incomes. The full and perhaps over indexation
of benefits during the past decade when real wages were fall
ing has sharply challenged this belief. As a result, the indexa
tion of social security, government pensions, and other
transfers has been critically examined and numerous pro
posals for their reductions have been made. Changes in the
methods of indexing federal pensions and food stamps have
already been enacted and further modification of other in
dexing provisions seems likely during the 1980s.
High rates of inflation may cause financial institutions to
be altered so that future payments reflect price changes. For
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the elderly, one of the most important of these institutions is
the employer pension system. Available evidence indicates
that real pension benefits after retirement have declined with
inflation. This is despite the fact that many firms provide ad
hoc increases. A more formal adjustment mechanism would
seem likely if high rates of inflation were to continue for
another decade.
Real income from assets depends on changes in the relative
rate of return to the items in an individual's investment port
folio. Rates of return fluctuate over time, with price changes
in houses, gold, diamonds, and stocks being recent ex
amples. Wealth allocation decisions of the elderly will be
based on expected future inflation rates and real rates of
return to their assets. In such a framework, the expected ef
fects of inflation on the real wealth of the elderly should not
differ greatly from its effects on the rest of the population.
Older persons also consume from their stock of durable
goods. These goods include the family car, home, furniture,
applicances, etc. The nominal value of consumption rises as
the replacement costs of these durables rise. The real value of
consumption from durable goods should be unaffected by
price increases and since the elderly often have a relatively
large stock of durables, the "indexation" of this income
source is important.
This summary indicates that most sources of income of the
elderly rise in response to increasing prices. There is no fun
damental reason to expect real earnings or return to assets to
fall with inflation. Most government transfer programs are
currently indexed to reflect price increases automatically.
However, policy changes in the next few years may alter
these provisions. Nominal pension benefits have been in
creased, but, in general, these increases lag behind price
changes; however, future institutional changes may
moderate this effect. Thus, income from private sources is
not fixed.
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Our analysis shows that currently it is not true that the
elderly live on fixed incomes and are, therefore, more
vulnerable to inflation than the total population. This is
especially true for low-income older persons who receive
almost all of their income from public sources. Did the elder
ly ever live on fixed incomes? This question is beyond the
scope of this paper; however, several issues are relevant.
Prior to World War II, over half the men aged 65 and over
remained in the labor force and thus had earnings that rose
along with those of other workers. Many lived on farms and
retained control of the extended family's resources.
Transfers from the family may have been replaced by
government transfers during the past several decades.
In the future, the effect of inflation on the real income of
the elderly will depend on private responses and government
changes. Will children increase their support for their aged
parents? Will individuals alter their lifecycle savings plans to
provide increased wealth for old age? Will the trend toward
early retirement be reversed? Will changes in political and
economic climate lead to a reversal of existing inflation pro
tection of the income of the elderly? Answers to these ques
tions will determine the future level of income and the effects
of inflation on the well-being of the elderly.
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Over the Hill
and Under the Weather
Age v. Health
Monroe Berkowitz
Rutgers University

Introduction
If there is an article of faith among gerontologists, it is
that chronological age is irrelevant. Over and over again, we
are told that some persons are ready for retirement in their
30s and 40s, while others are responsible for great
philosophical or scientific achievements well into their eighth
and ninth decade of life.
Examples of age and creativity are cited in the column by
Cyril F. Brickfield, executive director of the Association of
Retired Persons. 1 Jessica Tandy at age 74 opened trium
phantly on Broadway in the demanding role of Amanda
Winfield in the revival of Tennessee Williams' "Glass
Menagerie." Her performance was widely acclaimed by the
drama critics. Just down the street, Rex Harrison, at age 75,
opened successfully in the revival of "Heartbreak House"
by George Bernard Shaw, who continued to write plays until
late in life.
The same evidence is clear from last year's Nobel Prize
awards. At age 81 Barbara McClintock won the Nobel for
medicine while Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, 73, and
William Fowler, 72, shared the prize for physics.
Other examples abound. Benjamin Franklin invented
bifocals at age 78; Giovanni Colle at age 70 provided the first
113
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definitive description of blood transfusion and Benjamin
Duggar discovered a life-saving antibiotic at age 76.
Brickfield concludes that creativity can occur at any age,
even at advanced ages, and creativity in old age is not found
only among the rare individuals who are famous.
The absurdity of the compulsory retirement age is
dramatized neatly in a letter from Bernard L. Baer in the
New York Times, February 19, 1984. At age 73 Baer volun
tarily retired and after a year of frustrating idleness began to
look for jobs. He maintains he was 100 percent able mentally
and physically but was consistently and regretfully turned
down because of age. His background was in sales promo
tion, advertising and management. In desperation, he revis
ed he vita, simply lying by taking 11 years off his age. Within
two months he had a job.
Seven years later, even though he claimed he received
merit increases and additional responsibilities every year, he
was mandatorily retired at age 70. He was actually 81 at the
time and as able physically and mentally as when he retired,
according to his own version of events. This is one illustra
tion of how ridiculous mandatory retirement can be. He
notes, as many others have, "some people become incapable
in their 70s, 50s, 40s and 30s; many retain the capability
beyond their 70s. They should be appraised accordingly and
not automatically dispensed with."
I do not challenge this precept. Personal observation con
firms that some people of rather tender age would be happier
retired or at least not working in their current occupations.
But I cite one fundamental advantage of chronological
age—that is its definitiveness. All one needs to prove age is a
birth certificate, but once we discard the criterion of a
chronological age, we must seek substitutes. If there are dif
ferences among people in terms of ability and performance
on the job, how does one begin to think about measuring
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them? Once we forget the number of years one has spent in
this world, we must move on to less definite criteria to judge
ability to do the job at hand.
As it turns out, this is the mirror image of the problem that
those of us who have been interested in the economics of
disability have been struggling with for years. To distinguish
among those persons in the population who should be
classified as disabled and those who should not, to determine
who is qualified to receive a transfer payment because of a
disabling condition and who is not, is a very old problem. In
the disability case, the quest is for a measure of physical and
mental functional limitations; in the retirement case, it is a
search for measures of performance which probably depend
on residual functional capacities.
In this paper we examine the disability experience to show
how difficult the problem of determining disability status
has been. Nothing in the disability experience provides any
aid or comfort to those who allege that we should eliminate
compulsory retirement and judge persons by their ability to
do the job.
We first look briefly at the improvements in longevity
which are the reasons for the problem receiving so much re
cent attention. Scholars disagree as to whether the declines in
mortality are associated with improvements or declines in
health status. We discuss that controversy and conclude that
if our interest is in work ability, then it is something more
than health that we must be concerned with. It is not even
"active life expectancy," but the decision to participate or
not participate in the labor force.
We examine the disability record from ancient days to pre
sent to show how difficult disability determination decisions
have been. Even where sophisticated models seek to include
all relevant variables, it is the health measures which prove to
be most elusive. Examination of that experience leads us to
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advice caution in eliminating employers' freedom to retire
persons after a certain age.

Improvement in Longevity
What seems to be undisputed is the improvement in mor
tality rates in this century. 2 The greatest relative improve
ment has occurred at the young ages, resulting largely from
the control of infectious diseases. The probability of death at
age 0 decreased 90 percent between 1900 and 1980, but look
what has happened to those who survived to age 65. At age
65 the probability of death decreased 30 percent from 1900
to 1980 for males and 61 percent for females, a gap I expect
to see narrowed as women become increasingly subject to the
same pressures and hazards as men. In the meantime, those
males lucky enough to survive can look forward to this un
balanced relationship among the sexes.
We are dealing with a relatively new phenomenon. Life ex
pectancy at age 65 increased very little from 1900 to 1930,
but since that time there have been rapid gains in life expec
tancy at age 65 that have occurred for both males and
females, though again the females having the greater gains.
Incidentally, in spite of these improvements in mortality
rates, we should expect a decline in the net annual increase in
the number of social security beneficiaries at the turn of the
century. The low fertility rates during the 1930s will be
reflected in a considerable reduction in the rate of increase in
the population over 65 during the 1990s in spite of any im
provements in the mortality rate. This will come about just
at the time when the baby boom generation born after World
War II will be swelling the labor force.
After 2015, the growth in the labor force is expected to
slow down reflecting the decline of fertility rates which
began in the mid 60s. It is then that we expect social security
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financing problems, which can be alleviated if workers retire
later.

Improvements or Declines in Health
There come now the controversial issues. Alicia Munnell
forecasts that tomorrow's elderly will have improved life ex
pectancy, better health, and more education than those retir
ing today. 3 On two of these accounts, there can be no
faulting Ms. Munnell—improved life expectancy and more
education. The question of better health is one that is in
question.
In sharp contrast to Munnell's position is that taken by
James H. Schulz who believes that increased longevity does
not necessarily mean more surviving older persons will be
able to work. He emphasizes the many health factors that
operate to reduce mortaility may also reduce the
employability of older persons. Examples include: improved
survival from myocardial infarctions among the disabled;
the persistence of the incidence of arthritis or any of a
number other disabling conditions that do not generally
cause death; successful treatment of individuals with prob
lems such as diabetes that previously would cause early
deaths but that are still disabling, and alcohol or drug
abuse. 4
This discrepancy in the viewpoints of these two eminent
scholars has been pointed out by Michael Taussig in his
discussion of the two papers and it is Taussig who notes that
pension policy decisions depend critically on who is right.
"We expect that continued improvements in
medical care and technology will—in the absence of
nuclear war or some other catastrophe of com
parable magnitude—cause a large increase in the
number of persons who survive until, and well past,
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the traditional retirement ages in this country. We
do not yet know, however, whether the expected in
crease in longevity will cause a corresponding in
crease in the number of dependent aged persons. If
the aged workers of tomorrow is healthier than
either his or her counterpart today, and if there are
sufficient attractive job opportunities, then increas
ed longevity will not necessarily mean increased
dependency." 5
The same controversy runs through the early reports of the
National Commission on Social Security, as Jacob J.
Feldman has pointed out. In the March 1981 report, the ma
jority position was that increased longevity will be accom
panied by a corresponding increase in active life. Also, that
periods of diminished vigor associated with aging will
decrease so that the chronic disease will occupy a smaller
proportion of the typical life span. Yet a minority of the
Commission contended that the evidence does not support
any claim that longer life is equivalent to longer years of
good health. Feldman notes that the current state of
knowledge does not permit a definitive resolution of that
controversy. 6
Noting the dramatic decline in death rates, Feldman asks
whether that decline among persons 50 to 69 years of age is
tantamount to improved health and working capacity. He
notes first of all some short term trends. Using data from the
National Health Interview Survey, he notes that 21.9 percent
of men aged 65 to 69 answered that they had activity limita
tions that prevented them from working in 1970 a percentage
that increased to 24.9 in 1975 and 25.2 in 1980.
Even greater differences are to be found among the other
age groups in the 50 to 54, 55 to 58 and 60 to 64 ages. This in
crease took place during a period of rapid decline in death
rates for men in these age groups. Some suggestive data
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Feldman cites indicate that if we go back further, the
disability or activities limitation rate for men age 55 to 64
was about 10 percent in 1949 and even lower in 1935.
As Feldman notes, morbidity is difficult to quantify as op
posed to the relative ease of measuring mortality. Social
security actuaries rationalize their ignoring morbidity rates
on the grounds that mortality and morbidity are correlated;
when mortality improves, morbidity also tends to improve. 7
Feldman disagrees. He believes that a decline in mortality
rates can be connected with an increase in morbidity rates.
Life-threatening conditions are not the same as disabling
conditions. While there is obviously some overlap, a great
deal of disability is caused by conditions that are not lethal.
Musculoskeletal conditions are the cause of a large propor
tion of work disability. Arthritis, for instance, does not ap
pear to shorten one's life span to any great extent. In his
view, there is no reason why reductions in mortality rates
should result in a reduction in the prevalence of arthritis or
any of a number of other disabling conditions that are
generally not lethal.

Active Life Expectancy
Since there is sharp disagreement about whether mortality
and morbidity are closely correlated, it is necessary to have
something other than improvements in mortality rates if we
are to have confidence in estimates of the future labor supply
of older workers. The problem has been addressed by a
Massachusetts research team headed by Dr. Sidney Katz who
developed a concept of "active life expectancy." They use
life tables techniques to analyze the expected remaining years
of functional well-being for their sample of noninstitutionalized elderly people living in Massachusetts in 1974.
Waves of these people were interviewed at periodic intervals.
They found that the expected years of active life expectancy
range from 10 years for those 65 to 70 years to 2.9 years for
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those 85 years or older. Active life expectancy is shorter for
the poor than others and women had a longer average dura
tion of expected dependency than men. 8
It is a clever idea to construct life tables, not in terms of
expected date of death, but expected date of incapacity; the
contrast is between active versus inactive life. But the dif
ficulty is that the contrast is too sharp, the division too
abrupt. Scales of activities of daily living measure too much.
The scales measure six basic functions; bathing, dressing, go
ing to the bathroom, transfer, continence and eating. These
are essential biological functions.
If, however, interest is in whether people are ready to go to
work or not go to work, then it is obvious that some persons
who may score quite high on these activities of daily living
scales are still not necessarily able to jump into the labor
market. Measuring limitations of persons based on essential
biological functions is to move just one step from the mor
tality scales themselves.

Health, Labor Supply and Survey
One of the problems noted by Newquist and Robinson9 is
that health data, especially for the older population, has
been gathered for purposes other than employment policy
analysis. The problem is that the investigators discuss the
problem in terms of morbidity factors, or in terms of ac
tivities of daily living and these are clearly inappropriate.
What is necessary is to get some concept of health which is
applicable to the work decision and, at the same time, to
recognize that health is only one of the factors that will af
fect whether older persons are going to be active participants
in the job market. In short, what we are dealing with here is a
complex labor supply issue, complicated by this notion of
what constitutes health and what does not constitute health
and how one can measure it.
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This is a relatively old problem. It arises in theoretical and
empirical models of labor supply as researchers attempt to
include a health variable. The problem is present in surveys
which attempt to examine the number and characteristics of
disabled persons in the population. It has been a leading
problem for years in all of the programs designed to compen
sate persons who have disabling conditions. These include
tort cases where juries set indemnity payments according to
disability status, workers' compensation programs, and of
course, the Social Security Disability Insurance program.

The Ancient Origins of the Problem
The notion of compensation for injuries can be traced
back to the code of Hammurabi (1945-1902 B.C.). The
essential advance in Hammurabi's code was the partial
substitution of "compensation" to replace "retaliation." 10
One clear illustration of how compensation replaced
retaliation is found in Exodus, Chapter 21, verses 18 and 19:
18. And if men contend, and one smite the other
with a stone, or with his fists, and he die not, but
keep his bed;
19. If he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff,
then shall he that smote him be quit; only he shall
pay for the loss of his time and shall cause him to
be thoroughly healed.
The commentaries explain that compensation is awarded
on five grounds for damage, for pain, for healing, for loss of
time and for insult. (Insult apparently refers to payments
made when the harm was intentionally inflicted.) Liability
for healing extended to payment of medical costs. The com
mentaries are quite specific as to when liability ceases and
under what conditions the case may be reopened, to use the
modern phrase.
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The commentaries speak of payment for damages in what
appears to be strikingly modern terms. The idea was to look
at the injured person, to appraise his worth before the in
jury, and to contrast it with what he would be worth with the
impairment. In a perfect market, the difference would be the
present value of the future net product of the whole person
as contrasted with the impaired one. Of course, in those
days, there were examples at hand with slave markets, and
these capitalized values could be observed. They did not have
to be estimated by probabilistic functions dependent on im
perfect knowledge of future earnings streams.
The ancient examples permit us to look at several facets of
disability. In ancient codes and in modern day workers' com
pensation, disability is often equated with a loss of limb, loss
of an eye, or loss of hearing. Such losses are, of course, per
manent. For purposes of both labor market analysis and
disability analysis, it is permanent, chronic or long term, not
short term, phenomena or acute illness, that is relevant. The
permanent aspects are rather gruesomely exemplified by am
putation, which is not only long term but quite permanent.
Another dimension that has to be focused on is the con
cept of partial versus total disability and it is obvious, even in
ancient days, that a man could sustain rather extensive
physical damage and still participate to some extent in work.
Thus a persons is not either disabled or not disabled, but
there are various degrees of disability. The extent of disabili
ty becomes particularly important when trying to assess the
labor force chances of older persons.

Workers' Compensation Experience
Soon after workers' compensation was itnroduced in this
country, beginning in 1911, the state laws provided for
schedules derived from experience with private insurance
carriers and from some of the European laws. Schedules
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soon became hallmarks of compensation statutes. Essential
ly, these provided for a price, possibly the number of weeks
of compensation that was to be paid, for specified losses.
They detailed the prices of parts of the body. If a person lost
a finger, toe, or wrist and arm, the amounts of compensation
due him would be listed in the schedule, thereby minimizing
administrative discretion.
Eminent legal scholars argue about the nature of the
system. Larson believes it was a matter of operationalizing a
wage-loss system appropriate to large scale mass social in
surance programs." In effect, the schedules provided a way
to proxy the wage loss suffered by some average person with
these particular losses. Whatever the intellectual and
theoretical justification, the schedules never lived up to their
promise. The trouble was that persons simply did not always
lose limbs at the particular joints specified in the schedule.
More important, if the law that is going to compensate a per
son for loss of an arm triggers a particular amount of com
pensation, why not pay an equal amount for the loss of use
of that arm? But once you consider loss of use and injuries to
parts of the body not specified on the schedule, such as the
back or head, you are into an area where discretion has to be
used, thus defeating the purpose of the schedules.
The point to be made is that there are difficulties involved
in assessing the amount of disability payments due a person
with a particular type of work injury. The problem has been
recognized for years and years under our workers' compen
sation statutes.
In workers' compensation, the worker alleges either that
he cannot now work at all, or that he cannot now work at the
level of energy or capacity that he could prior to his injury,
or that his injury has left him in a condition that will in
terfere with his future ability to perform tasks in the same
manner and method as he could have, had he not incurred
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that injury. The workers' compensation commissions
therefore have the task of deciding whether there has been
any such interference with the work potentiality of the in
dividual and if so, how that deficiency can be measured. As
noted above this is the mirror image of the problem faced by
the aged. In the retirement case, it is the worker who alleges
that his ability to work at his task, in the same degree of effi
ciency and manner as before, has not been impaired. The
employer who advocates retirement of the worker, alleges
otherwise. Consequently, the question arises as to the ap
propriate tests of limitation or residual capacity.
In workers' compensation where the schedules are not ap
propriate (the vast majority of cases in most states), the com
missions have developed several different theories to deter
mine payment.
In some jurisdictions, payments will be made if the worker
can demonstrate specific physical or mental impairment.
Other states will not pay unless the worker can demonstrate
actual wage loss. Jurisdictions in between, as it were, at
tempt to evaluate a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
In any event, each of these methods has its distinct limita
tions. Physical impairment is difficult to measure and more
difficult to translate into compensation payments. It is one
thing to be able to evaluate physical losses and another to be
able to price these losses in some way that is meaningful in
the labor market.
When it comes to wage loss, a method that is now being
widely touted because of its recent adoption in the State of
Florida, there are obvious difficulties. Michigan, for many
years, had a wage-loss system in workers' compensation, but
unfortunately, the complexities of the system, the institu
tional arrangements, or other factors resulted in most cases
ending up in compromise and release settlements. 12 So,
although Michigan technically had a wage-loss system, it was
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to all intents and purposes really a bargaining system based
on a workers' physical condition.
Michigan also had a problem which was unique among the
states. Many workers who retired from automobile plants
simultaneously filed workers' compensation claims. The socalled retirement problem exposed, in raw relief, the essen
tial issue with which we are concerned. To what extent are
workers who formally retired realistically in the labor
market? Interestingly enough, in the Michigan cases, the
claim was that the retirement status did not bar access to the
labor market, rather it was alleged that some physical condi
tion incurred during working life prevented working at the
wages that otherwise would have been earned. The terrible
complexities of that situation again argue for a certain ar
bitrariness in defining an age of retirement, no matter how
inequitable this may be to particular individuals.
It seems to be quite clear that no workers' compensation
program had the lock on a perfect solution to its problems.
All that can be said is that some states that actively interven
ed in the administration process and combined rehabilitation
techniques with its administration of benefits were more suc
cessful than others who depended on purely legal ad
ministrative methods.

Social Security Disability Insurance
The problems of workers' compensation were well known
to the framers of our national Society Security Disability In
surance Act. 13 Although it was thought that disability in
surance would come on stream early in the history of social
security, as a matter of fact the federal government entered
the field with the disability freeze in the 1950s and it was not
until 1960 that we began a full-fledged disability insurance
program.
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Two of the pitfalls were neatly eliminated in the disability
insurance program of social security. One was the decision
not to pay any permanent partial benefits. Either a worker
was to be considered disabled or not disabled. This decision
created a host of problems even as it solved others. There
was no easy way to dispose of doubtful cases. The other
problem eliminated was the confusion over retirement and
disability. Workers could collect disability insurance only up
to the age of 64. At age 65 they would receive social security
retirement benefits. No one over the age of 65 was eligible to
receive disability insurance benefits on their own account.
The definition of disability under the Act was the inability
to engage in substantial gainful activity that is due to a
physical or mental impairment that is expected to last at least
12 months. To be considered disabled under this rather strin
gent definition, a person has to be unable to perform any
work which he is reasonably qualified to perform, anywhere
in the economy. It was not a test that depended on the ability
to perform th duties of one's job, or even one's occupation.
Although all workers age 50 and over were entitled to col
lect disability insurance payments as early as 1956, it was not
until 1960 that the program became a general one for all
covered workers below age 65. Thus we have not yet seen a
full generation of workers who are covered by the Social
Security Act disability provisions pass through their working
lives.
By 1970 we were paying out about $2.7 billion a year in
disability insurance benefits, an amount that increased to
$7.6 billion by 1975, a 175 percent increase. The increases in
the program continued between 1975 and 1976, reaching
$11.1 billion in 1977. Although payments have not peaked,
the number of beneficiaries did at about that year, and since
then, the increases in payments have been modest, ranging
about 9 to 10 percent each year in payments as wage levels
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have escalated. All told, from 1970 to 1980, there has been a
436 percent increase in disability insurance payments.
Although the decline in the numbers of beneficiaries began
to come as early as 1977, the public consciousness of this
decline did not surface until a good bit later. It was the 1980
amendments to the Act which tightened the administrative
regulations as to who should or who should not receive
benefits. More important, they provided for a review of
these benefits and it is the administration of this review
which has created a great deal of public concern over the last
several years, especially for those persons with mental ill
nesses.
The problem is a familiar one and it is exactly the same
problem that we have had in workers' compensation and in
every disability program. How does one tell whether one is
disabled; under what conditions does one buy this ticket out
of the labor force? Bear in mind that the pressure to increase
retirement ages and to stay in the labor force has been
matched by this pressure for certain people to get out via the
disability benefits.
The problem has been that the criteria actually used de
pend a great deal on the showing of some severe medical im
pairment. Probably 80 percent of the awards are made to ap
plicants who have one or more impairments equivalent to
those listed in the federal regulations. It is only for people
who do not meet these so-called "medical listings" that con
sideration is given other factors such as the person's training,
education and experience.
This possibility excessive reliance on medical conditions
ignores the fact that there is a large gap between medical con
dition, on the one hand, and the withdrawal from the labor
force which is the prerequisite for disability benefits, on the
other.
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Not Medical Condition Alone
My reasons for emphasizing this difference comes from
two sources, one sociological and one economic. The
sociologists, largely influenced by Saad Nagi and others, 14
have emphasized the differences between medical condition,
impairment, functional limitation, and the resulting disabili
ty. They recognize that a medical diagnosis based upon
symptoms and signs and classified largely according to body
systems, is useful to the physician interested in cure, but
possibly irrelevant to the problem of work, in part because
of the large differences in the extent of severity of any condi
tion.
The issue is whether or not that medical condition leads to
an impairment, the enervation of a nerve or the loss of a limb
to take an extreme case. From there, we need to know
whether or not that impairment results in any functional
limitation. We are thinking of such things as ability to lift, to
carry, to stoop, to bend, to walk, or in the case of mental im
pairments, the equivalent of functional limitations which
may be the ability to relate to others or to tolerate the stresses
of a normal job. I will return to that problem of getting the
equivalent of functional limitations in mental illnesses in a
moment.
From an economic point of view, it is essential that we
have some measure of functional limitations as a health
variable in an attempt to explain whether or not people with
disabilities choose or do not choose to participate in the
labor force. What the framers of the disability insurance law
and, for that matter, workers' compensation laws never
recognized explicitly, but always recognized implicitly, is
that there are disincentive effects to these benefits. These
disincentive effects are related to the generosity and the
leniency of the disability transfers generally. The matter is
well put by Barbara L. Wolfe:
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The older disabled person's work/retirement
choice depends on potential earnings in the labor
market, the availability and generosity of
disability-related transfers and other income sup
port programs and the disability status of the in
dividual. Disability status reflects limitations of
physical, mental or emotional sort which reduce the
worker's ability to perform the required functions
of jobs which he is on other grounds qualified to
hold. It is a concept that links impairment with the
requirements of specific jobs. 15
The work that as been done thus far attempts to measure
the income and substitution elasticities associated with
changes in net wage rates on unearned income generated by
income transfers. Several studies have attempted to look at
this problem. 16 Wolfe points out the problem with these
studies, including their choice of the variable to represent
health is that some of them do not capture severity, duration
or the relation of functional limitations to past or available
occupations. There are other problems relating to the
measurement of availability of disability-related transfers
and the fact that some of these leave out labor demand
variables and include only a few labor supply variables.
Some of the problems with the so-called first generation
studies have been remedied in the second generations of
these studies. 17 Each of the later studies is a fairly
sophisticated work-choice model, and each of them has dif
ficulties in dealing with so-called true health status of the
employee.
Parsons, as Wolfe points out, uses subsequent mortality as
his health status measure. But as we have discussed above,
there is a great deal of controversy about the relationship
between mortality and morbidity. Wolfe also points out that
Leonard's disability status indicator consists of 27 specific
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health problems, diseases, conditions and infirmities. It
poses a number of difficulties. It gives no indication of
severity, it gives no indication of degree of functional limita
tions and it is not linked to job requirements.
Slade's disability measure indicates whether or not the in
dividual reports that he or she is limited in getting around.
This simple self-reported status has a number of problems.
Wolfe notes that since it is measured contemporaneously
with labor force participation, it may reflect the individual's
taste for work and, hence, it may be endogenous to the
model.
The Haveman and Wolfe disability measures are selfreported measures and while they convey duration and inten
sity, they are very general and may be subject to the charge
that they allow the legitimization of failure. Persons who are
unsuccessful at work may be motivated to define themselves
as permanently sick in order to legitimize their self-defined
failure. All of these measures capture only some limited
dimensions of the relevant concept of disability.

Functional Limitations Again
What is needed for purposes of econometric surveys, for
the various transfer payment programs, and I believe for the
retirement decisions for aged persons, is a better measure of
functional limitations.
The search for these measures has been going on for some
time. The American Medical Association, as far back as
1971, under the guidance of a committee chaired by Dr.
Henry Kessler, issued the Guides to the Evaluation of Per
manent Impairment. 18 Here we have a detailed look at essen
tially physical impairment or functional limitation measures.
Such measures required a physical examination to deter
mine, for example, the extent of flexion of the extremities.
The Guides specify the exact percentage of disability that
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ought to be assigned for particular conditions. This is a
heroic attempt to deal not only with the extremities but to
deal with the evaluation of permanent impairment of backs,
heart disease and a number of other types of condition which
would not ordinarily be thought of as being scheduled.
We also have to note the attempt by the Social Security
Administration in its survey to deal with measures of func
tional limitations by self-reported responses. These obvious
ly do not go far enough. It should be possible to develop
these scales so as to give us some clue as to whether or not a
person is capable of working, insofar as his health is con
cerned.
We think a promising beginning is made in the so-called
functional assessment inventories developed by the Universi
ty of Minnesota. We are currently engaged in a research pro
ject where we are trying to test these as measures of func
tional limitation in a vocational rehabilitation program. 19
What all this boils down to is that the same issues that
arise as we deal with disability can crop up as we seek to
measure ability. If one wishes to eliminate compulsory retire
ment age, residual functional capacity measures become im
portant. We have to get down to looking not at a medical
condition classification or even impairments, but rather
whether or not a person is able to carry out the physical and
mental functions required by the job or by any job. In this
regard, there is no doubt that the area we know least about
has to do with mental impairments. That evaluating mental
impairments and the residual functioning capacity is a
troublesome problem is nowhere more apparent than in the
Disability Insurance program. Most of the controversy has
arisen in this area as more and more persons have been
denied benefits in this review process which began in 1981.
Over 900,000 beneficiaries were evaluated as to their
eligibility status and almost 400,000 of these lost benefits as a
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result of these investigations. A disproportionate amount of
those who lost benefits were persons with mental im
pairments of one sort or another. Conceptually, we are just
beginning to understand what the equivalent of physical
limitation or functional capacity for mental impairment is. It
is obviously necessary that we consider such things as carry
ing out and remembering instructions, responding ap
propriately to supervision and coworkers and reacting to
customary work pressures in a routine work setting.

Measuring Ability of Older Workers
and Retirement Issues
Ability or inability to work because of a mental or physical
impairment is difficult to determine, but however the issue is
decided, we know that examination of that person's medical
condition is not enough. It is not the medical condition, but
the consequences of that condition—how that condition af
fects an individual human being's mental and physical func
tioning that counts, and even that is not enough. We must
look at how the limitations or residual functioning capacity
interacts with a host of other factors to determine that per
son's labor market chances.
These complex considerations are the same whether we are
considering the injured worker fighting to retain his job,
another worker doing his best to maximize his disabling con
ditions so as to leave the labor force, the older worker who is
seeking to retain his position or the employer seeking to
retire him at age 65.
The dispute that rages over whether improvements in
longevity will mean an increase in healthier workers fighting
to stay in the labor force or an increase in impaired older per
sons who will become dependent on the working population
probably centers around the wrong issues. Here again, it is
not simply a question of possible changes in morbidity levels
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of older workers. Their health must be considered together
with such factors as their education, their training, the con
dition of the labor market and the levels of social insurance
benefits. Does that mean that health is not important? No,
but it is their physical and mental functioning, not their
medical conditon, that is going to be the important health
variable to be considered.
Are we serious about wanting to encourage the participation
of older workers in the labor force? Are we serious about
eliminating compulsory retirement age? If we are, it calls for
action on all fronts, not merely passing legislation which im
poses costs without assurances of corresponding benefits.
We will have to think not only about education and training
programs but retraining programs as workers progress
through their life cycles. If we are going to live in a rapidly
changing high technology economy, and if we want to have
workers equipped to deal with its problems, it is obvious that
one injection of education which concludes at age 22 or 23 is
not sufficient to carry workers over the next four, let along
five or six decades of life.
It is just as obvious that our retirement policy is affected
by levels of social insurance benefits and particularly by how
we penalize workers who retire early or reward them for
staying past the normal retirement age. The 1983 amend
ments to the Social Security Act will increase normal retire
ment age to 67 by 1990 and increase the benefits for workers
staying past their normal retirement age.
Bear in mind that the argument for abolition of com
pulsory retirement centers around the notion that
chronological age is irrelevant. That sword cuts both ways.
Some older people are competent past the age of retirement
and some younger people are incompetent prior to the age of
retirement. Eliminating the compulsory retirement age
means that we have to get serious about tests of performance
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for younger workers, and to the extent that health is impor
tant, as I think it is, we have to get serious about devising
measures of physical and mental limitations which can be ap
plied in sufficiently standardized fashion so as to move the
discussion away from medical diagnosis to tests of function.
Our experience with disability programs should give us
pause, but at least the right questions can be asked. If we
have no compulsory ending point to the work experience and
we substitute tests of performance, these may well be applied
to workers long before they reach what used to be the ar
bitrary age of retirement.
Is has always been an eligible defense against a charge of
poor performance for a worker to note that, whatever his
level of performance, it has not changed. If it has been con
doned for years by the employer, arbitrators have been un
willing to view low levels of performance as a cause for ter
mination. That kind of argument is spreading as dismissal
cases move into law courts in nonunion situations as the doc
trine of "employment at will" seems to be deteriorating. In
short, if one seeks to terminate an employee, it is necessary
to show that something has changed. For this and other
reasons, we need particularly sensitive measures of physical
and mental functioning, if not general performance ap
praisals.
Possibly this may be placing too great a burden on ar
bitrary tests and on our systems of dispute settlement, be
they arbitration or the courts. It might be that we could
make use of the doctrine of presumptions. We could set an
age of retirement, be it 65, 67 or 68, and if an employer seeks
to retire someone prior to that age, we could require him to
show that the workers is no longer able to meet the legitimate
requirements of the job. Or that his physical or mental func
tioning, if we deal with it at that level, has deteriorated to the
point where he is not able to carry on. The presumption
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would be used in the opposite way for situations past that
age where the employee would have to carry the burden of
proof. In short, if the employer sought to retire a person past
that age, the presumption would be that that would be O.K.
but that the employee would now have the burden of show
ing that he or she was competent to perform the re
quirements of the job and that he or she has the requisite
physical and mental capacities to perform the necessary
tasks.
The use of presumptions might minimize litigation but one
cannot be too sanguine about its possibilities. It is sad but
true that, since the ancient days of Babylonia, we have found
no satisfactory way to determine the disability status of an
individual. There simply is no reason to believe that we could
do much better if we seek to determine, in some legal sense,
the "ability" status of an older person who the employer
seeks to retire.
We should recognize that there are limits on what govern
ments can accomplish in this field. It is one thing to say that
compulsory retirement at a predetermined age is a bad
policy; it is another to say that governments should attempt
to forbid an employer from retiring a person at that age.
The arguments against governmental interference in this
area go beyond the usual ones which relate the advantages of
private decisionmaking. We simply lack the technical
knowledge to derive administered tests of ability applicable
to the wide range of occupations and industries in the U.S.
Without such substitute tests, eliminating the chronological
age test promises to usher in extensive litigation and to im
pose other costs on private employers to the detriment of our
competitive situations. If this is too extreme a position and if
notions of discrimination on the basis of age, any age, are
firmly entrenched, then laws prohibiting compulsory retire-
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ment are not enough. An integrated national policy requires
us to move on several fronts: to reexamine our programs of
education and training and our prevailing pay practices, to
recognize the incentives and disincentives posed by the social
insurance programs, and possibly simply to brace ourselves
for yet another wave of litigation as arbitrators and courts
consider essentially the same kinds of issues they have been
struggling with in the disability area.
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